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Testing Racial Profiling: Empirical Assessment of 
Disparate Treatment by Police 
Sonja B. Starrt 
Statistical evidence plays a central role in litigation, scholarship, 
and public debates about race and policing. At one level, the statistical 
picture is clear: people of color in the United States, especially black 
men, interact with police far more often than white Americans do. 
Black Americans are about 2.5 times more likely to be arrested each 
year as their white counterparts. 1 Local studies show even larger racial 
disparities in the frequency of stops and use of force, although there are 
no national numbers. 2 
But while these gaps' existence is not contested, the reasons for 
them are. An especially hotly disputed question is whether and to what 
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. For comments and helpful discussions on prior 
versions, I am grateful to Alicia Davis, Avlana Eisenberg, Mark Fancher, Jim Greiner, Sam Gross, 
Louis Kaplow, Randy Kennedy, Anup Malani, Jonathan Masur, David Moran, J.J. Prescott, Eve 
Brensike Primus, Jon Sacks, Margo Schlanger, Michael Steinberg, Matthew Stephenson, and Kirri 
Thomas, as well as Legal Forum participants and workshop participants at Harvard, University of 
Chicago, University of Michigan, University of Texas, University of Wisconsin, University of 
Colorado, and UC-Berkeley. Brian Apel, Grady Bridges, Alex Harris, A vi Kupfer, Linfeng Li, and 
Andrew Sand provided excellent research assistance. 
1 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics Arrest Data Analysis Tool, the 2012 arrest 
rate was ten percent for black adults and four percent for whites; disparities are larger for more 
serious crimes. The Bureau of Justice Statistics's national estimates are not broken down by 
Hispanic ethnicity, or by race and sex combined. Arrest Data Analysis Tool, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS, http://www. bjs.gov/index.cfm ?ty=datool&surl =/arrests/index.cfm# (follow "National 
Estimates" hyperlink, then follow ''Trend Tables by Race" hyperlink). 
2 See, e.g., ACLU, BLACK, BROWN, AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007-2010, 1 (2014), https://aclum.org/app/uploads/2015/ 
06/reports-black-brown-and-targeted. pdf [https: //perma.cc /GT9J -QTSC] (finding large disparities 
in pedestrian stop-and-frisk rates in Boston); see Jodi M. Brown & Patrick A. Langan, BUREAU OF 
JUST. STATISTICS, NCJ 180987, POLICING AND HOMICIDE, 1976-1998: JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE BY 
POLICE, POLICE OFFICERS MURDERED BY FELONS (2001), at iii (finding blacks four times as likely 
as whites to be killed by police); Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of 
the Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More 
Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1275-76 (2004) (describing traffic stop disparities); Rachel 
Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96 MARQ. L. REV. 1119, 1139-40 (2013) (calling 
for better data collection). A new, federally funded initiative seeks to build a national database on 
stops and use of force. Ctr. for Policing Equity, Nation's First Police Profiling Database Awarded 
Grant By NSF (Nov. 7, 2013), http://policingequity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/database 
_release_final. pdf [https: //perma.cc/XW8B-ZJLK]. 
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extent these disparities result from police discrimination on the basis of 
race. That question, which is the central constitutional issue under 
longstanding equal protection doctrine, sharply divides public opinion-
largely along racial lines. 3 Among commentators, polar opposite 
answers are each often presented as indisputable.4 In part, these 
conflicts persist because the question is very challenging to answer 
empirically, due to data limitations and challenges of causal inference. 
In this Article, I explore why measuring disparate-treatment 
discrimination by police is so difficult, and consider the ways that 
researchers' existing tools can make headway on these challenges and 
the ways they fall short. Lab experiments have provided useful 
information about implicit racial bias, but they cannot directly tell us 
how these biases actually affect real-world behavior. Meanwhile, for 
observational researchers, there are various hurdles, but the hardest 
one to overcome is generally the absence of data on the citizen conduct 
that at least partially shapes policing decisions. Most crime, and 
certainly most noncriminal "suspicious" or probable-cause-generating 
behavior, goes unreported and undetected, and is unobservable to 
researchers. The available measures of observed crime are not 
necessarily good proxies for total crime, and in any event, such data 
generally do not exist at an individual level that can be linked to 
individual outcome data on police interactions. Meanwhile, while we 
often do have data on the subset of people who are stopped by police, 
analyses limited to those individuals are often distorted by selection 
bias and by the absence of exogenous measures of their conduct; 
researchers have no choice but to rely, circularly, on what police write 
down. 
These hurdles are serious. Some headway has been made in 
particular contexts in which quasi-experimental methods or direct 
physical observation by researchers is possible, but most policing 
contexts are not readily amenable to these approaches. It may be 
possible to do more using survey methods, though these pose their own 
3 E.g., Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen 
Perceptions, 83 Soc. F. 1009, 1017 (2005) (finding blacks six times likelier than whites to believe 
police prejudice is a problem in their city). 
4 For example, a recent letter from civil rights and community leaders called the pattern of 
"aggressive police tactics [against young black men] ... too obvious to be a coincidence .... [I]t is 
time for the country to counter the effects of systemic racial bias." Letter from Maya Rockeymoore 
et al., to President Obama (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/ad/public/ 
static/letter/ [https://perma.cc/95ZD-BTBZ]. By contrast, prominent commentator Heather 
McDonald stated: ''It is black crime rates that predict the presence of blacks in the criminal justice 
system. Not some miscarriage of justice." Meet the Press, NBC (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www. 
nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-a ugust-1 7-2014-n 182641 
[https: 1/perma.cc /36HS-HFTR]. 
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challenges. And when it comes to assessing discrimination against 
neighborhoods of color (as opposed to individuals), it is sometimes 
possible to rely on aggregate-level data to make plausible claims. Often, 
however, the limits of available data will mean that it is just not 
possible to determine whether the police are discriminating based on 
race. These research challenges are also problems for courts, litigants 
challenging such discrimination, and police departments themselves as 
they seek to comply with their constitutional obligations. 
I suggest, in some contexts, that a new approach would work 
better. The method I propose is called "auditing," which would employ 
"testers" (probably undercover officers) of different races to elicit 
possible interactions with the police. Auditing has not been tried or 
even discussed in the law enforcement field, which is surprising 
because for decades it has been a central tool in antidiscrimination 
research and civil rights enforcement more generally. It presents 
safety, legality, and efficacy concerns when applied to policing, but with 
careful design I argue that these concerns can be overcome. If so, 
auditing could provide something observational research usually 
cannot: causally rigorous analysis of police discrimination in a real-
world setting. 
Part I begins by examining why it is important to develop good 
methods for measuring "disparate treatment" discrimination by police. 
Disparate treatment is certainly not the only source of racial disparity 
in policing that researchers or policymakers should care about. That 
said, constitutional doctrine forces us to confront the question, and, I 
outline other moral and policy reasons for why we should be concerned 
about disparate treatment. I also examine the conceptual problems 
associated with thinking of racial discrimination as a "cause" of 
disparity. In Part II, I examine existing methods of analyzing disparate 
treatment: individual- and neighborhood-level regression analyses, 
quasi-experimental methods exploiting variation in police ability to 
observe race, and lab experiments on implicit bias. In Part III, I set 
forth the auditing proposal and explore its advantages, challenges, and 
limitations. 
I. WHY MEASURING DISPARATE TREATMENT MATTERS 
This paper addresses methods of estimating something quite 
specific: police racial discrimination of the "disparate treatment" 
variety, in the sense that U.S. courts use that term. 5 By this, I mean 
5 I use the terms "disparate treatment" and "discrimination" interchangeably throughout 
much of the paper, although "discrimination" can also entail broader meanings. 
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the extent to which police treat persons who are otherwise similarly 
situated (along relevant dimensions that the police perceive) differently 
because of race. Disparate treatment by police includes what is 
commonly called racial profiling: that is, disparate treatment that is 
based on race-based assumptions about differential crime risk. It also 
could encompass any other way in which racial perceptions consciously 
or unconsciously affect the decision-making of police vis-a-vis 
individuals or communities. In Sections A and B, respectively, I briefly 
outline some legal and policy reasons that disparate treatment 
discrimination is an important target of empirical estimation. In 
Section C, I make clear that I do not think this is the only valid way of 
conceptualizing racial inequality in policing, and I distinguish it from 
other conceptions that are also worthy subjects of empirical, legal, and 
policy analysis. Finally, claims of disparate treatment are causal in 
nature, and in Section D, I unpack what it means to treat race as a 
"cause" in this way. 
A. Racial Profiling and Constitutional Doctrine 
Why do we need good empirical estimates of racially disparate 
treatment by police officers? The most obvious reason is that the 
existence of governmental disparate treatment is the central question 
posed by current equal protection doctrine. Current doctrine precludes 
constitutional challenges solely premised on racially disparate impact 
(i.e., differential effects on different racial groups)6 or discrimination by 
private actors like witnesses.7 But, as I show here, police racial 
discrimination essentially always violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
It is, however, difficult to prove, which makes effective empirical 
strategies especially important. 
Although there is a strong scholarly consensus that racial profiling 
should be considered unconstitutional, scholars often question whether 
the Supreme Court agrees. Many have critiqued the Court for leaving 
the door open to police reliance on race.8 These critics have grounds for 
6 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976). 
7 One could argue that when the police give effect to private discrimination by carrying out 
stops and arrests, state action is generated. Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948) 
(barring judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants). But doctrinally, this is likely a 
nonstarter, see Don Herzog, The Kerr Principle, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2006) (dismissing a 
similar hypothetical extension of Shelley), and would also set a difficult standard for police, who 
may not know when witnesses are racially biased. 
8 E.g., Delores Jones-Brown & Brian A. Maule, Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 140, 141-43 (2010) (Stephen K. Rice & Michael D. White eds. 2010); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 163, 164-66; 
Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425, 442-43 (1997); Evan 
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frustration: the Court has avoided squarely deciding whether the Equal 
Protection Clause bars racial profiling and has meanwhile foreclosed 
Fourth Amendment strategies. Moreover, lower courts have been 
unwilling to second-guess police reliance on race-specific suspect 
identifications, even in extreme cases. 9 Still, as I show here, broader 
equal protection doctrine leaves little ambiguity. Racial profiling (by 
which I mean reliance on conscious or subconscious racial 
generalizations about criminality, as opposed to specific suspect 
identifications) clearly violates the Equal Protection Clause as the 
Court has consistently interpreted it in other cases outside the policing 
context. 10 It is even more obvious that it would be unconstitutional for 
police to discriminate on the basis of some other type of racial bias 
unrelated to crime prevention aims, so I will focus on the racial 
profiling issue here. 
Scholars examining the relevant constitutional doctrine have 
mainly focused on the Court's numerous adverse Fourth Amendment 
precedents. 11 These include Whren v. United States, 12 which held that a 
traffic stop provides probable cause for a vehicle search even if the 
traffic violation was a mere pretext, and United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 13 which suggested that Mexican appearance might provide 
reasonable suspicion of an immigration violation when combined with 
other factors, but not alone. These cases were indeed big setbacks for 
those challenging racial profiling, but they do not directly implicate 
equal protection claims. Brignoni-Ponce sent a confusing signal (why 
suggest that ethnicity may be relevant to Fourth Amendment analysis 
Gerstman & Christopher Shortell, The Many Faces of Strict Scrutiny, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 46--50 
(2001); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious 
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010); Meaghan Paulhamus et al., State of the Science in 
Racial Profiling Research, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING 239, 242-43. 
9 Notoriously, in Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit 
upheld the interrogation of 200 black men based on a white victim's description of a black male 
assailant. For critiques, see Gerstman & Shortell, supra note 8, at 47; Alschuler, supra note 8, at 
179-92. However, courts do consistently distinguish the use of race in specific suspect descriptions 
from using race to make behavioral generalizations about broad groups. See R. Richard Banks, 
Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA 
L. REV. 1075, 1078-80 (2001) (critiquing this distinction). 
10 The Sixth Circuit has gotten this issue wrong, however. E.g., United States v. Travis, 62 
F. 3d 170, 174 (6th 1995); see Alschuler, supra note 8, at 178-79 (critiquing this and other cases). 
11 E.g., Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 8, at 140-57; Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops 
and Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 309, 312-13; 
Johnson, supra note 8, at 1006--08. 
12 517 U.S. 806, 813-16 (1996). 
13 422 U.S. 873, 885-87 (1975); see United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 
(1976) (holding that the authority of police to consider Mexican ancestry is greater during stops 
made at checkpoints than during roving stops). 
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if its consideration is barred by the Fourteenth?), but that possible 
signal does not trump the more directly relevant equal protection 
precedents striking down decision-makers' use of race even when it is 
combined with other factors. 14 Many scholars have critiqued the 
doctrinal separation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment objections 
to racial profiling, 15 but the upside of this approach is that adverse 
Fourth Amendment holdings do not decide the Fourteenth Amendment 
issue.l6 
The Supreme Court has never directly decided whether racial 
profiling by the police violates the Equal Protection Clause, but to say 
that it does not, it would have to upend decades of doctrine. The key 
line of cases has arisen in contexts outside policing, but its principles 
are directly applicable. It concerns the prohibition of "statistical 
discrimination." When applying heightened scrutiny, the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that otherwise-impermissible 
discrimination cannot be justified based on group generalizations, even 
if those generalizations are empirically accurate. Instead, individuals 
must be treated as individuals.l7 
For example, in Craig v. Boren, 18 the Court struck down a law 
establishing different minimum drinking ages for men and women. It 
was unmoved by studies showing that young men drove drunk at ten 
times the rate of young women, because these findings lumped all 
young men together. Similarly, the Court has struck down 
governmental reliance on gendered or racial generalizations about 
learning styles, 19 juror voting,20 and workforce participation.21 All these 
14 E.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977). 
15 E.g., Alschuler, supra note 8, at 193 (reviewing commentary); David A. Sklansky, Traffic 
Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 309-
29 (1997). 
16 Scholars have suggested that Whren and related cases green-light racial profiling in car 
searches. See Jones-Brown & Maule, supra note 8, at 153-57 (also citing Maryland v. Wilson, 519 
U.S. 408 (1997) and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)); Fagan et al., supra note 
11, at 312; Paulhamus et al., supra note 8, at 242-43. This is likely often true in practice, because 
it was a huge blow to Fourth Amendment claims. But while declining in the Fourth Amendment 
context to dig into police's true motives, Whren did not suggest it would be legal to rely on race-it 
suggested otherwise. 517 U.S. at 813 ("[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally 
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment"). 
17 See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 823-29 (2014) (analyzing these cases). 
18 429 u.s. 190, 202-04 (1976). 
19 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996). 
20 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130-31 (1994); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
79, 90, 97-98 (1986). 
21 See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 690-91 (1973). 
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generalizations had statistical support, but the Court made clear that 
this doesn't matter: basing disparate treatment on groups' typical 
tendencies is unfair to atypical individuals within the group. The Court 
has carved out exceptions only for physical sex differences relating to 
pregnancy.22 It has never made exceptions for generalizations about 
behavior, and it would be shocking if it did so for racial generalizations 
about criminal tendencies. 
This line of cases should be fatal to the most likely constitutional 
defense of racial profiling, namely the claim that profiles are 
empirically supported and thus facilitate the police objective of 
preventing crime. This is so even assuming crime prevention is a 
compelling state interest.23 In none of the cases reviewed above did the 
Court assess whether the statistical generalization in question 
established an important government interest. Rather, the prohibition 
on statistical discrimination is best understood to constrain the kinds of 
reasoning that the government can offer to establish its interest. 
Otherwise, the law in Boren might well have survived scrutiny, for 
example. The government clearly has an important interest in 
preventing drunk driving-yet it was barred from using statistical 
evidence to show a relationship between that interest and the gender 
classification. 
In any event, law enforcement bodies have generally agreed that 
racial profiling is illegal. For example, in 2003, the U.S. Department of 
Justice declared it "absolutely prohibited."24 The remaining ambiguity 
in the case law may therefore be irrelevant in practice. Modern police 
departments do not defend racial profiling. They deny that they engage 
22 See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 68 (2001). Note that, while race-based 
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, gender-based classifications are subject to an 
intermediate standard of review due to "enduring" physical differences between men and women. 
Virginia, 518 U.S at 533. 
23 See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531 (listing prohibition on gender generalizations and a 
substantial relationship to important government interests as separate requirements). 
24 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: RACIAL PROFILING 3 (2003), http://www.justice.gov/ 
archive/opa/pr/2003/J une/racial_profiling_fact_sheet. pdf [https: //perma.ccMTQR6-GHJ3]. A 2014 
guidance qualifies this prohibition under limited circumstances for national-security-related 
screenings, in particular when looking for persons suspected to be associated with a particular 
terrorist or criminal organization "whose membership has been identified as overwhelmingly" 
being of a particular race. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY 2 (2014), https: //www.justice.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/ag I 
pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf [https: //perma.cc /R8RC-ELQU]. However, the 
guidance explains that even in this context officers must avoid "invidious profiling" and must 
instead rely on specific "trustworthy information, relevant to the locality or time frame"-for 
example, reliable information that members of a "foreign ethnic insurgent group" are planning a 
suicide bombing targeting the president of that foreign country during a state visit. Id. at 9-10. 
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in it. 25 Settlements in racial profiling lawsuits frequently contain terms 
prohibiting "any consideration of race."26 
If the Fourteenth Amendment argument is doctrinally well-
supported and not in practice contested, why do litigants routinely not 
win Fourteenth Amendment challenges? And why has the Fourth 
Amendment played a more prominent role in profiling litigation? The 
key reason is evidentiary: it is very hard for litigants to prove racial 
profiling.27 Individual criminal defendants raising selective-
enforcement defenses face especially steep hurdles.28 In federal 
criminal cases, just getting discovery is notoriously difficult. 29 Even if 
defendants can show a broad pattern of discrimination, they must also 
show that it affected their cases specifically. Statistical evidence almost 
25 E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing Arizona sheriff's 
defense to equal protection suit: "[d]efendants do not engage in racial profiling"); PBS NewsHour, 
(PBS broadcast Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/nation-july-dec13-stopfrisk_08-13/ 
[https://perma.cc/JAZS-CVVS] (quoting NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly: "We do not engage 
in racial profiling. It is prohibited by law [and] by our own regulations."); Greg Risling, Associated 
Press, DOJ Finds 2 LA Sheriff's Stations Discriminating, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (June 28, 2013), 
http: //www .sandiegouniontribune.com/news/20 13/j un/28/ doj-finds- 2-la -sheriffs-stations-
discriminating/ [https://perma.ccNP7R-K8CC] (quoting L.A. Sheriff Department spokeswoman 
Steve Whitmore: "We stand resolute that we have not discriminated against members of the 
public[.]"); Jane Prendergast, Officers' Hearts Hold Racial Profiling Solution, Chief Says, CIN. 
ENQUIRER (Mar. 6, 2001), http: //enquirer.com/editions/2001103/06/loc_officers_hearts_hold.html 
[https://perma.cc/8QZG-WXUD] (quoting Cincinnati police chief: Profiling "is not only wrong, it's 
unconstitutional. It's illegal. We know that. We teach that."); Sho Wills, Chicago, New York 
Officers Spar Over Stop-and-Frisk Policy, CNN (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/14/ 
us/new-york-chicago-stop-frisk/ [https://perma.cc/FDW6-4933] (quoting Chicago Police Department 
spokesman Adam Collins: "[W]e don't engage in racial profiling."); Letter from S.C. Kitchen, 
Defense Attorney, to Assistant U.S. Attorney General Thomas E. Perez (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://www .timesnewshosting.com/docs/johnson.pdf [https: //perma.cc/P8FF -49YF] (denying 
allegations that Terry Johnson, Sheriff of Alamance County, had engaged in racial profiling). 
26 See Sam R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Profiling and Drug Interdiction on 
the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651, 741-43 (2002). 
27 See id. at 653--57, 741; Johnson, supra note 8, at 1063--64; David Rudovsky, Law 
Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches without 
Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 322-29 (2001); Sklansky, supra note 15, at 326 ("[C]hallenges to 
discriminatory police practices will fail without proof of conscious racial animus on the part of the 
police .... [T]his amounts to saying that they will almost always fail."). 
28 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Supreme Court denied a 
motion for discovery on a selective prosecution claim because plaintiff failed to show that 
"similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted."); see also RANDALL 
KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 354 (1997) ("Research has uncovered no cases" of 
convictions overturned for selective prosecution, as of that date.). 
29 The Supreme Court has required "some evidence" of "differential treatment of similarly 
situated members of other races." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465--67. Armstrong addressed a claim of 
selective prosecution, and the Supreme Court has never specifically held that it applies to 
disparate-policing cases; in my view, it should not. Identifying a "similarly situated" group is likely 
especially difficult in policing cases: police keep no "records of instances in which they could have 
stopped a motorist ... but did not." Davis, supra note 8, at 438. 
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never clears this hurdle alone, though it might help m combination 
with case-specific qualitative evidence. 30 
For these reasons, the best prospects for equal protection 
challenges to succeed are in civil cases (class actions or government 
enforcement actions), in which the pattern of discrimination is the 
issue. Such cases can and have succeeded, and have had important 
consequences for police practices; the Floyd v. City of New York 31 
litigation, which helped to bring about the New York Police 
Department's (NYPD) massive reduction in stop-and-frisk practices, is 
a recent example.32 Such claims turn centrally on statistical evidence. 
B. Other Policy Reasons to Measure Police Disparate Treatment 
Some commentators, while acknowledging the legal importance of 
the disparate-treatment question, have dismissed its moral importance. 
David Thacher, for example, describes the focus on "racial profiling" as 
a parochial concern of lawyers-a distraction from "substantive" 
equality. 33 Other critics have dismissed the focus on intentional 
discrimination as "legalistic."34 Moreover, beyond the policing context, 
30 In principle, strong statistical evidence could allow an inference that the defendant 
probably would not have been stopped but for race; this would be the logical inference if a 
defendant's race made him more than twice as likely to be stopped. But courts have resisted this 
sort of reasoning, see Harcourt, supra note 2, at 1278, just as they are often uncomfortable 
inferring individual causation from statistics in other kinds of cases. See Laurence H. Tribe, Trial 
by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1349-51 (1971). 
In McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the Court refused to allow a defendant's challenge to 
his capital sentence to rest solely on statistical findings of racial disparity in death penalty 
administration. This holding emphasized deference to prosecutors and juries, and could possibly 
be distinguished in a challenge to police racial profiling; in some other criminal-law contexts 
where equal protection claims were made, the Court has been more receptive to statistical 
evidence of discrimination. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U.S. 545 (1967). 
31 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
32 It is hard to disentangle the relative influence of the Floyd lawsuit from that of broader 
changes in politics and police department policy, especially because the highly public lawsuit and 
the evidence of disparities that plaintiffs provided may have shaped the politics of the stop-and-
frisk debate. After Mayor DeBlasio's election, the City dropped its appeal and agreed to a three-
year monitoring plan in early 2014. Ray Sanchez et a!., New York Drops Appeal of Controversial 
Stop-and-Frisk Ruling, CNN (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/30/us/new-york-drops-
stop-frisk-appeal/ [https://perma.cc/H3AR-VBVA]. Stop-and-frisk rates, already declining during 
the period the lawsuit was pending, continued to decline sharply, and in 2015 they were an 
estimated ninety-six percent below their peak in 2011. See Stop-and-Frisk Down, Safety Up, 
NYCLU (Dec. 10, 2015), http: //www.nyclu.org/news/stop-and-frisk-down-safety-nyclu-data-
analysis [https: //perma.cc/QGR8-GGPZ]. 
33 David Thacher, From Racial Profiling to Racial Equality 1-2 (Aug. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript) http: //fordschool. umich.ed u/research/pa pers/PD Ffiles/02-006. pdf [https: //perma.cc I 
X2CF-49KK]. 
34 Robin S. Engel, A Critique of the 'Outcome Test' in Racial Profiling Research, 25 JUST. Q. 1, 
5-9 (2008). This and some similar critiques, however, seem to caricature the "legalistic" 
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legal scholars have also long critiqued the focus on colorblindness, 
arguing that equality law should primarily target group subordination, 
not forbidden classifications.35 On this view, use of racial classifications 
may be appropriate if they are invoked for a purpose that helps to 
promote substantive equality-the proper objective is not to be blind to 
race, but rather to acknowledge and seek to reduce racial stratification. 
From this perspective, a focus on disparate treatment discrimination 
can be critiqued for the narrowness of its inquiry, and for its embrace of 
a "colorblindness" objective that-in other contexts-has been an 
obstacle to race-conscious efforts to promote a more substantive vision 
of racial equality. 
I generally sympathize with this anti-subordination view. But 
racially disparate treatment by police is still worth worrying about and 
measuring, and not just for the practical reason that current equal 
protection doctrine demands it. Whether the police racially 
discriminate is not "merely" a legalistic concern. Racially disparate 
treatment adds a substantively meaningful dimension of harm 
(exacerbating substantive racial inequality), as well as a distinct target 
for policy interventions. 
Critics of racial disparities in policing have emphasized the role of 
discrimination, "racial profiling," or just "racism."36 This framing ought 
not to be dismissed as mere legalism; it is not only coming from lawyers 
and is not usually centrally motivated by legal doctrine. Rather, it has 
perspective, confusing the normative claim that disparate treatment matters (and is worth 
measuring) with the empirical claim that such disparate treatment is necessarily at the root of all 
observed disparities. For example, Pickerill et al. seem to suggest that legal scholars who focus on 
racially disparate treatment assume "race is the sole factor that causes police to search motorists." 
J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and Seizure, Racial Profiling, and Traffic Stops: A Disparate 
Impact Framework, 31 LAW & POL 'y 1, 2 (2009). Engel likewise claims that "the legalistic 
perspective" assumes away racial differences in crime rates and assumes racial profiling is always 
ineffective. Engel, supra, at 7. Both claim that such legal scholars believe raw disparities are never 
normatively justified. Id. at 9; Pickerill et al., supra, at 5. But such claims are not common in legal 
literature, and none are "legalistic"; the law makes it hard to infer discrimination from disparity. 
It is perfectly consistent to critique disparate treatment while recognizing that other factors also 
contribute to disparities. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 149-51. 
35 E.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: 
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 (2003) ("Antisubordination 
theorists contend that guarantees of equal citizenship cannot be realized under conditions of 
pervasive social stratification and argue that law should reform institutions and practices that 
enforce the secondary social status of historically oppressed groups."). 
36 E.g., The Targeting of Young Blacks by Law Enforcement: Ben Jealous in Conversation 
with Jamelle Bouie, AM. PROSPECT (Fall 2014), http: //prospect.org /article/targeting-young-blacks-
law-enforcement-ben-jealous-conversation-jamelle-bouie [https: //perma.cc/64C8-L YRH]; 
Rockeymoore et al., supra note 4; Press Release, Rep. John Lewis on Shooting of Michael Brown 
and Events in Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 14, 2014), http://johnlewis.house.gov/press-release/rep-
john -lewis-shooting-michael-brown -and -events-ferguson- missouri [https: //perma.cc IN C9S-W8MB]. 
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cultural resonance and moral force. 37 The harms of racially disparate 
policing are thus often substantially amplified by a sense of racial 
targeting. Perceptions of police racism also deeply undercut trust in the 
police in black communities, which may undermine police 
effectiveness. 38 In short, racially disparate treatment may be just one 
morally troubling cause of racial disparity, but it is an important one. 39 
The particular harms associated with racially disparate treatment 
are, if anything, amplified by the purported justification that implicitly 
or explicitly underlies it, namely generalizations about racial groups' 
crime rates. For the government to generalize that people of color are 
dangerous, and to specifically target them on that basis for surveillance 
and arrest, is expressively and morally noxious, especially because such 
generalizations have a painful history in our culture.40 I am not 
suggesting that one should not acknowledge racial differences in crime 
rates where they exist. What is poisonous is using those differences to 
justify ignoring differences within groups, making law-abiding citizens 
"pay for fears generated by criminals with whom they are lumped by 
dint of color."41 This expressive harm is part of the distinctive injury 
done by racial profiling specifically. 
Moreover, it is practically useful to disentangle police disparate 
treatment from other causes of policing disparities, even if one views 
those other causes as normatively problematic as well. Teasing out 
different causes of disparity can help guide policy responses. For 
example, many police departments have recently invested effort in 
implicit-bias testing and training, an approach that assumes that 
policing disparity is at least partially grounded in the assumptions 
37 See REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., MEASURING RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 103 (2004) (stating 
more generally that "the broader public vision of what discrimination means [is] the treatment of 
two (nearly) identical people differently"). 
38 See KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 151-53; Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and 
Cooperation, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 84, 102-04; Weitzer & Tuch, 
supra note 3, at 1017-18. 
39 To be sure, a "colorblind" policing objective could sometimes interfere with efforts to 
achieve other equality objectives, including equality conditional on criminal conduct. For example, 
if certain stop criteria are less predictive of guilt for one race than another, police might have to 
take race into account when interpreting them if they want to avoid imposing racially disparate 
impacts. I do not seek to resolve these dilemmas here, although my own leaning would be to 
permit race-conscious efforts to avoid disparate impacts, favoring a more substantive view of 
equality. The current Supreme Court might not agree, however. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 
557 (2009) (casting doubt on the constitutionality of race-conscious efforts to avoid disparate 
impact liability). 
40 See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 28, at 16; Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the 
Messenger, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 129-30 (1987); President Barack Obama, Remarks by the 
President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon-martin [https: //perma.cc/82B5-N7 AC]. 
41 KENNEDY, supra note 28, at xi. 
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officers make about people of color.42 Empirical estimates of disparate-
treatment discrimination could help to motivate this and other 
interventions that seek to alter police decision-making processes. On 
the other hand, to the extent that such analyses show that policing 
disparities are substantially grounded in other causes, they will help to 
warn us that interventions that merely seek "color-blind policing" may 
prove disappointingly unable to eliminate those disparities. In that 
case, alternative or additional policy interventions may be called for, 
and I discuss a couple of examples in the next Section. 
C. Distinguishing the Estimation of Disparate Treatment from Other 
Objectives of Policing-Disparity Research 
Although estimation of disparate treatment by police is a 
worthwhile objective for empiricists, it is not the only worthwhile 
objective, and it bears emphasis that there are many normatively 
important sources of racial disparity in policing that this concept does 
not encompass. Several other conceptions of racial inequality in 
policing have been and should be the focus of empirical inquiry as well. 
For readers who are attempting to make sense of seemingly conflicting 
statistics concerning race and policing, it is important to clarify that 
not every study is attempting to measure the same thing. That is, 
different studies either implicitly or explicitly conceptualize racial 
inequality in different ways-some of which are quite different from 
disparate treatment discrimination. Here, I identify a few key 
examples. 
1. Raw racial disparity. 
First, estimating disparate treatment is a narrower and much 
more difficult task than estimating raw racial disparities in police 
interactions. Raw disparity statistics entail simple comparisons across 
racial groups of the per capita rates of police interactions, or, similarly, 
comparisons of a group's population share to its share of police 
interactions. Such statistics have played an important role in debates 
about race and policing, including some empirical studies,43 some legal 
scholarship,44 and a large share of media coverage.45 For example, one 
42 Tracey G. Gove, Implicit Bias and Law Enforcement, 78 POLICE CHIEF 44 (2011). 
43 E.g., Jeff Rojek et al., The Influence of Driver's Race on Traffic Stops in Missouri, 7 POLICE 
Q. 126 (2004). 
44 E.g., Bennet Cappers, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment: Race, Citizenship, and the 
Equality Principle, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (2011); Johnson, supra note 8; Floyd 
Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of African-Americans in the Selective Enforcement of Laws: 
In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 724 n.9 (2004). 
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recent study found: "Blacks were subjected to 63% of [pedestrian stops], 
even though they made up just 24% of Boston's population."46 
Raw disparities are easy enough to measure, so long as police 
departments collect data about the police interaction in question and 
the demographics of those subjected to it. Such data are available on a 
national scale for arrests, but are only available in some jurisdictions 
for other interactions such as stops, searches, and use of force. This 
data shortcoming is a readily soluble problem, requiring only political 
will and commitment of some resources, and there is currently a 
significant effort funded by the U.S. Department of Justice to build a 
national database on stops and use of force. 47 Raw disparities are 
comparatively easy to estimate because, properly understood, they 
entail no causal claims and do not require measuring difficult-to-
observe variables such as crime commission or suspicious behavior. 
As critics often point out, identifying the existence of raw 
disparities does not tell us the reasons for them, and in particular does 
not prove police racial discrimination. But raw disparity statistics are 
very importapt for other purposes; most obviously, they demonstrate 
that people of color disproportionately bear the burdens of our criminal 
justice system and its expansion in recent decades. And while policing 
can obviously also bring benefits to communities, the burdens it 
imposes are substantial. Interacting with police is often stressful and 
scary, 48 and even if no charges are brought, arrest records can produce 
stigma, job-market consequences, and increased sentences in future 
cases.49 If charges and punishment are pursued, the consequences of 
police interactions are obviously even greater, and much of the racial 
disparity in U.S. incarceration rates can be explained by disparate 
45 E.g., Jess Bidgood, Boston Police Focus on Blacks in Disproportionate Numbers, Study 
Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/09/us/boston-police-focus-on-
blacks-in -disproportionate-numbers-study-shows.html? _r=1 [https: 1/perma.ccnYVG-YYER]; see 
Greg Ridgeway & John MacDonald, Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 180, 181 (describing the "compulsion in media reports" 
to focus on per-capita racial disparities in police stops). 
46 ACLU, supra note 2, at 1. 
47 Nation's First Police Profiling Database Awarded Grant By NSF, CTR. FOR POLICING 
EQUITY (Nov. 7, 2013), http: 1/policingequity.org /wp-content/uploads/2013/12/database_release 
_final. pdf [https: 1/perma.cc /XW8B-ZJLK]. 
48 See Alschuler, supra note 8, at 212-13; Rod K. Brunson, Beyond Stop Rates: Using 
Qualitative Methods to Examine Racially Biased Policing, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, 
supra note 8, at 221, 224-33. 
49 See, e.g., Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find 
Consequences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-
arrest-records-rise-americans-find -consequences-can -last-a -lifetime-1408415402 
[https: //perma.cc/H2TE-69C5]. 
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arrest rates.50 These burdens are not merely borne by the guilty-
especially the burdens of stops and searches, most of which produce no 
evidence of wrongdoing. 51 
Empirical research on raw disparities can add to our 
understanding of these burdens. And it provides an essential starting 
point for any further empirical assessment of why those disparities 
exist, and for a policy assessment of what can be done about them. 
Disparity research can motivate policy changes within the criminal 
justice system as well as broader changes outside of it, such as social 
policies addressing poverty and other root causes of crime-rate 
disparities. 
2. Other criminal justice policies and practices that shape racial 
disparities. 
Second, if researchers seek to go beyond simply measuring 
disparities, and identify causes of those disparities that can be 
addressed via changes to criminal justice policies, disparate treatment 
discrimination is not the only such cause that should be of interest. 
Rather, researchers can shed light on the racially disparate impacts of 
facially race-neutral policy choices, including the ways we define 
crimes, grade their severity, and apportion enforcement resources. 
Such studies have been relatively uncommon, but one example is Golub 
et al.'s study of NYPD's massive increase in marijuana enforcement 
during the 1990s; the authors show that this change very 
disproportionately affected black and Latino New Yorkers.52 This 
disproportionate effect might or might not have been the product of 
police discrimination in the disparate treatment sense-Golub et al. did 
not seek to answer this question. But regardless of the answer, the 
choice to prioritize marijuana enforcement in the first place was a 
choice-one that did not have to be made, and could be reversed-
which had strongly racially disparate consequences. 
50 See, e.g., Brett E. Garland et al., Racial Disproportionality in the American Prison 
Population, 5 JUST. POL 'y J. 1, 14-25 (2008) (reviewing literature); Alfred Blumstein, Racial 
Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 743 (1993) (In 1991, 
seventy-six percent of the black-white incarceration gap stemmed from arrest.). Black 
incarceration rates are about six times the white rate. One in nine black men under age thrity-five 
is incarcerated. JENIFER WARREN ET. AL., PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN 
AMERICA 2008 3, 6 (Feb. 2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-lmediallegacy/uploadedfiles/ 
wwwpewtrustsorg /reports/sentencing_and_corrections/onein 1 OOpdf. pdf [https: //perma.cc /A25F-
KHLL]. 
51 See David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" 
Matters, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 36, 49. 
52 Andrew Golub et al., The Race/Ethnic Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in 
New York City, 6 CRIM. & PuB. POL'y 131, 137 (2007). 
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3. Racial disparity unexplained by crime. 
Often, efforts to explain policing disparities empirically assess only 
one explanatory variable other than race: crime commission. That is, 
researchers as well as lawyers, courts, and other commentators often 
ask: are racial disparities in stops, arrests, and other policing statistics 
explained by racial disparities in crime commission? These 
comparisons, which are made routinely by both defenders and critics of 
police departments, often take the form of comparing a racial group's 
share of crimes to its share of police interactions ("share comparisons"), 
with crime measured according to some benchmark such as police 
reports or survey data.53 Alternatively, they sometimes take the form of 
comparing, across racial groups, the ratio of police interaction rates to 
crime rates ("ratio comparisons"). 54 
In another paper, I offer an extensive critique of these sorts of 
comparisons, which often dramatically overstate crime's explanatory 
role by ignoring the fact that not all those who are subjected to police 
interactions are guilty.55 If researchers want to assess whether criminal 
conduct explains policing disparity, "share comparisons" and "ratio 
comparisons" will be distorted by their failure to account for 
interactions with the innocent. 56 There are plausible alternative 
approaches, including regression analyses that include both race and 
some measure of criminal conduct as regressors. I consider challenges 
associated with this kind of analysis in Part II.A. 
In any event, these simple three-variable comparisons (police 
interaction rates, race, crime), even if constructed in a more sensible' 
way, should usually not be interpreted as estimates of police racial 
discrimination. The question of whether people with similar criminal 
53 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime 
and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 311, 328 (1997) (comparing fifty-six 
percent black robbery suspect share to sixty-one percent arrest share); Stacey Patton, If You're 
White, That Joint Probably Won't Lead to Jail Time, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2014), 
https: //www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-youre-white· that-joint· probably· wont-lead-to-jail-
time/2014/0 1110/caa94154-77f8-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_story .html [https: //perma.cc/3TAE-N8PT] 
(comparing fourteen percent black drug-user share to thirty-four percent drug-arrest and fifty-
three percent drug-incarceration shares). 
54 See, e.g., BLANKET AL., supra note 37, at 193 (comparing eighteen percent black speeding 
share to seventy-three percent search share). 
55 See generally Sonja Starr, Race and Policing: How to Make Sense of the Numbers (And How 
Not to), Working Paper (on file with author), Part I; For additional commentary on this approach, 
seeR. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 
CAL. L. REV. 1169 (2006); JeffDominitz, How Do the Laws of Probability Constrain Legislative and 
Judicial Efforts to Stop Racial Profiling?, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 412, 414 (2003). 
56 See generally Sonja B. Starr, Explaining Race Gaps in Policing: Normative and Empirical 
Challenges Part II (Univ. of Mich., Working Paper No. 15-003, Jan. 19, 2015). 
500 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2016 
conduct are treated similarly by police may be morally important in its 
own right, and worthy of empirical estimation; I discuss the reasons 
this is so in my other paper. 57 But it is generally not the same as the 
disparate-treatment question, and it is not the focus of this piece. For 
the purpose of estimating racially disparate treatment, crime is one 
important potentially confounding variable, but not necessarily the 
only one. "Accounting for crime" alone might lead to either an 
overestimate or an underestimate of police racial discrimination, 
depending on which way other unobserved variables cut. 
For this reason, in Part II.A, I assume that observational 
assessments of police discrimination will usually also seek to account 
for other variables. However, it may be reasonable to treat crime as the 
only relevant confounding variable in one (fairly common) situation: 
where the police themselves argue that policing disparities are 
explained by crime differences, and offer no additional explanations. 
Then, the analysis can be seen as testing whether the department's 
explanation holds up. 
4. Irrational or "taste-based" discrimination. 
While disparate-treatment discrimination is a relatively narrow 
way to conceptualize policing inequality, an even narrower conception 
underlies one common approach to the estimation of policing disparity. 
This approach compares across races the "hit rates" of police 
interactions-usually, the rate at which stops lead to arrests, which is 
taken as a proxy for guilt. Assuming police are motivated to maximize 
the number of arrests, equal hit rates across races are interpreted to 
show that police are considering race "rationally"; unequal hit rates 
imply irrational "taste-based" discrimination. Hit-rate models dominate 
the economic literature on policing disparities.58 Elsewhere, I have 
critiqued these models on a number of fronts, arguing that they rely on 
faulty empirical assumptions and make wrong predictions. 59 
57 Id. 
58 The seminal paper is John Knowles et al., Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory 
and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); see also Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Generalizing the 
Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in Law Enforcement, with an Application to Vehicle Searches in 
Wichita, 116 ECON. J. F351 (2006); Ruben Hernandez-Murillo & John Knowles, Racial Profiling or 
Racist Policing? Bounds Tests in Aggregate Data, 45 INT'L ECON. REV. 959 (2004); Nicola Persico, 
Racial Profiling, Fairness, and Effectiveness of Policing, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1472, 1479 (2002); cf. 
GARY 8. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 140-42 (1996) (providing the central insight that 
"tastes for discrimination" are generally not efficient to discriminators). 
59 Starr, supra note 55, at Part II. For additional criticism, see also Harcourt, supra note 2, at 
1295-1314 (criticizing the economic models of racial profiling because (1) the models incorrectly 
define "success" as maximizing the total number of arrests, and (2) the models assume that the 
official criminal rates are a good proxy for real offending rates). 
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Here, however, I will simply observe that estimating "taste-based" 
discrimination is not the same as estimating racially disparate 
treatment. The theory underlying hit-rate models distinguishes taste-
based discrimination from statistical discrimination (use of race as a 
proxy for a legitimate consideration with which it is correlated-here, 
criminality). Hit-rate models assume that racially unbiased police will 
consider race when assessing how suspicious somebody is-that is, the 
likelihood of criminality-if indeed there are racial differences in crime 
rates. Economists sometimes defend statistical discrimination as 
efficient, although the conditions under which it is so have been much 
debated.60 
But as discussed in Section A, U.S. constitutional law draws no 
distinction between racially disparate treatment that is grounded in 
statistical generalizations and racially disparate treatment that is 
grounded in mere preference or prejudice. Both are components of 
unconstitutional discrimination, and so an approach that measures 
only the latter will be underinclusive, even assuming other empirical 
concerns can be set aside. For this reason, I do not include the hit-rate 
studies in Part II's review of methods of estimating police 
discrimination: they are unsuited to the task at hand. 
D. On Race and Causation 
Estimates of disparate-treatment discrimination are estimates of 
causal effects, not mere correlations-specifically, the causal effect of 
citizens' race (or of the racial compositions of communities) on police 
decision-making.61 But identifying causal effects of race is challenging 
in practice and perhaps conceptually as well, because race is not a 
"treatment" subject to manipulation. Its effects are intertwined with 
each individual's other attributes and life experiences-which may 
themselves have been influenced by race. Scholars have therefore 
debated whether the language of causal inference can be meaningfully 
applied to race at all. 62 Perhaps we cannot sensibly ask how a person's 
60 See Peter Norman, Statistical Discrimination and Efficiency, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 615 
(2003); Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 
(1972) (providing a seminal theoretical account); Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination 
Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228 (1986). 
61 See, e.g., Lincoln Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and 
Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. Soc. 299, 302 (2006) (defining "discrimination" as "the causal effect 
of race"). 
62 D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable 
Characteristics, 93 REV. ECON. & STAT. 775, 783-84 (2011); Maya Sen & Omar Wasow, Race as a 
Bundle of Sticks: Designs that Estimate Effects of Seemingly Immutable Characteristics, 19 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 499 (2016). 
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outcome would have differed but for her race if her entire life would 
have been different in that counterfactual.63 
This conceptual hurdle is not insuperable, however. Usually, when 
we ask causal questions about racial discrimination, we are not asking 
about the lifelong effects of race, but rather about discrimination in a 
particular decision process (e.g., arrest). The counterfactual is how the 
decision-maker would have responded had she encountered a person of 
a different race whose relevant characteristics (as perceived by the 
officer) were otherwise similar. To assess this question, it does not 
really matter how or why the individual developed those observable 
characteristics, and in particular whether race affected the likelihood of 
his doing so. This counterfactual analysis need not entail imagining, for 
example, a "white version" of a black citizen, identical in all ways but 
race. It entails merely comparing the way police treat people with 
similar observable and decision-relevant characteristics-for example, 
white and black drivers who are driving the same speed on a given 
highway. 
James Greiner and Donald Rubin have suggested referring to 
"perceived race" to highlight the fact that we are talking about the 
decision-maker's perspective.64 Another way (slightly clearer, in my 
view) is to say that we are assessing the "effects of police racial 
discrimination," if police are the decision-makers of interest. In any 
event, though, I think there is not much harm in the shorthand "effect 
of race," provided we are clear on what it means. Note that if one did 
want to examine "the effect of dynamic, cumulative discrimination" 
throughout a person's life (and, even further back, the life of his family 
and community), the strategies discussed in the next Part would not 
much help, but raw disparity estimates might.65 
Moreover, in my view, it is not only conceptually possible to assess 
the effects of racial perceptions on police treatment of individual 
communities; it is important to do so, for reasons outlined in Sections A 
and B above. Of course, we should think about race as "causing" 
policing disparities through multiple channels, of which police racial 
discrimination is just one. When we estimate disparate treatment 
discrimination by police, we should remember that components of racial 
63 Issa Kahler-Hausmann made such an argument at this Symposium. Policing the Police: 
The 2015 Legal Forum Symposium, U. OF CHIC. LEGAL F. (Nov. 6, 2015), https:/llegal-
forum. uchicago.edu/page/symposium [https: //perma.cc/B6TQ-G EAL]; see also Iss a Kahler-
Hausmann, Detecting Discrimination In Policing (Or, The Dangers of Counterfactual Causal 
Thinking . . .), BALKINIZATION (Aug. 13, 2015), http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com/2015/08/detecting-
discrimination-in-policing -or .html [https: //perma.cc /EXE8-5BSE]. 
64 Greiner & Rubin, supra note 62, at 775. 
65 BLANKET AL., supra note 37, at 225-27. 
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disparity that appear to be explained by other "race-neutral" variables 
may ultimately be the product of the many other ways racial 
discrimination has divided and constructed our society. 56 
Beyond these conceptual issues, there remain practical challenges 
associated with causal inference about the "effects of race" even in the 
narrower sense of discrimination by a particular decision-maker. A key 
problem is that unlike other "treatments" that social scientists study, 
race does not vary for any given individual, and is thus hard to 
disentangle from other characteristics. Immutable traits generally defy 
observational researchers' best tools for causal inference, such as quasi-
experiments exploiting shocks to a treatment. Instead, researchers 
must use methods-such as regression, reweighting, and matching-
that share a core limitation: their ability to support causal inferences 
depends on the assumption that the only relevant confounding 
variables are those the researchers observe and include in the model. 
Because omitted variable bias is always possible, careful researchers 
often refer to the race gaps that remain after controlling for observed 
variables simply as "unexplained," rather than claiming proof of 
discrimination. 67 
Fortunately, neither policy analysis nor law requires definitive 
answers. For policy purposes, even analyses with weaker causal 
identification can help narrow down the possible causes of racial 
disparities; theoretically informed discussion can then guide 
interpretation of unexplained gaps. In civil litigation, the burden of 
proof normally requires that the factfinder believe that the :best 
interpretation of the evidence is that discrimination probably had some 
effect. Non-statistical evidence of causation is routinely open to 
multiple interpretations, and while courts have often demanded more 
clarity out of statistical evidence, certainty or even near-certainty is too 
much to ask for. 68 Moreover, it should be unnecessary to rule out every 
conceivable confounding variable-as suggested above, the question 
really should be whether the police department's explanations for 
disparities hold up.69 
66 See generally Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 63. 
67 See. e.g., Quillian, supra note 61, at 303. 
68 The case that set the hardest standard was McCleskey, in which the Supreme Court, 
invoking deference to prosecutors and jurors, held that "exceptionally clear proof" of 
discrimination was required to support a challenge to the death penalty. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 297 (1987). But it's not obvious that McCleskey's reasoning applies to policing at all, and 
it does not apply to civil lawsuits alleging a pattern of discrimination. McCleskey (and every 
federal appellate case following it) centers on the problem of inferring discrimination in an 
individual criminal case from a broader statistical pattern. 
69 In petit and grand jury discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has required the state to 
articulate reasons for its decisions and "stand or fall on the plausibility" of those reasons. Miller- El 
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In the remainder of this discussion, I assume that strong causal 
identification is the ideal goal of research on police racial 
discrimination, and this assumption drives the new proposal that I 
outline in Part III. However, in Part II, I also examine what we can 
learn from observational research that falls somewhat short of this 
goal. 
II. ASSESSING CURRENT EMPIRICAL APPROACHES 
In this Part, I assess leading current empirical approaches to the 
assessment of police racial discrimination. First, I consider the use of 
regression or similar observational methods to try to isolate the effects 
of such discrimination by accounting for alternative explanations for 
policing disparities. Section A evaluates the (limited) utility of such 
methods to assess individual-level discrimination in initial police stops; 
Section B considers their use to assess neighborhood-level 
discrimination in stops, which is generally somewhat easier; and 
Section C addresses regression analyses of post-stop outcomes. In 
Section D, I look at a small but promising body of quasi-experimental 
research that seeks to exploit variations in decision-makers' ability to 
perceive race-an approach that, under certain assumptions, obviates 
the necessity to observe crime and other potential confounders. Finally, 
in Section E, I assess lab-experimental work on implicit racial bias, 
which provides strong causal identification of one psychological 
mechanism for police discrimination, but does not directly assess real-
world disparities in treatment. 
A. Individual-Level Analyses of Racial Disparities in Stops 
Suppose you wanted to conduct a regression analysis to assess 
potential explanations for racial disparities in a city's police stop 
rates-in particular, you want to know whether those disparities 
persist even after controlling for plausible race-neutral explanations. 
Ideally, what kind of data would you need to carry out the analysis, and 
what would you do with it? This is an instructive thought exercise to 
begin with before we turn to the less-than-ideal data sources that 
observational researchers actually have. 
It is useful to think about racial disparity in policing as having two 
key dimensions: disparities among neighborhoods with different racial 
compositions, and disparities in the treatment of individuals within 
neighborhoods. Assuming policing varies across neighborhoods, any 
v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005); see Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494-95 (1970) (holding 
that this burden·shifting can be triggered by statistical evidence of disparate impact). 
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given individual's stop probability may be affected both by the 
neighborhood he is in and by his own characteristics and behaviors. To 
assess the way these components combine to explain a city's overall 
racial disparity patterns, one would want an individual-level dataset-
ideally covering a large random sample of individuals in the city-and 
you would want it to contain each individual's home address (and 
possibly work address), so that you could also include variables for 
neighborhood-level characteristics. 70 
For each individual in the sample, you would first need to know his 
race and whether and how often the police stopped him in the time 
period covered. Second, you would need to think about potential race-
neutral explanations for stop patterns. Because police typically explain 
policing disparities by reference to differences in criminal conduct, you 
would want rich data on the individual's behavior over some fixed time 
period. You would want to know what crimes the person committed 
over the time period, how often, and whether they were committed in 
public. You would want to know more generally how much time the 
individual spent out in public, potentially subjecting himself to a stop. 
The most important behavioral information you would want is how 
often the person engaged publicly in behavior that-while not 
necessarily criminal-could help to produce reasonable suspicion for a 
stop. 
Ideally, you would want to break all of this behavioral data down 
to a fine-grained temporal level (e.g., person-days or even person-hours) 
so that you could estimate the probability of being stopped conditional 
on being engaged in crime (or suspicious activity) at that time. You 
would also want crime rates at the neighborhood level, since police 
typically point to neighborhood crime-rate differences as an explanation 
for policing disparities, and since "high crime area" is also a factor that 
can contribute to constitutionally reasonable suspicion.71 Besides crime, 
you might also want to disentangle the roles of other individual and 
neighborhood differences-for example, to distinguish racial from 
socioeconomic discrimination, you might want socioeconomic data about 
neighborhoods or individuals. 
70 If you wanted to separate out the effect of the individual's race from the effect of 
neighborhood racial composition, you'd include both variables separately in the regression. 
Leaving the neighborhood-composition variable out would effectively combine the two components. 
If you wanted to focus the analysis only on intra-neighborhood disparities, you could control for 
what neighborhood each individual is in (neighborhood fixed effects), which effectively controls for 
all inter-neighborhood differences simultaneously. However, the use of neighborhood fixed effects 
will filter out any police racial discrimination that occurs at the inter-neighborhood level, based on 
racial composition. 
71 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
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If you had all this information, you could estimate the probability 
of being stopped in a given time period conditional on actual criminal 
activity, other external indicia of suspiciousness, and the individual's 
and neighborhood's fixed characteristics. You could use regression or a 
similar method (like matching or reweighting) to estimate the effect of 
the individual's race and his neighborhood's racial composition on stop 
probability, holding all other factors constant. Such a regression would 
effectively control for the variables that police departments typically 
point to as explaining policing disparities (plus perhaps other potential 
confounders). Although omitted variable bias is always a potential 
issue in this kind of analysis, if your dataset were rich enough, it would 
be quite plausible to attribute remaining unexplained racial gaps to 
police racial discrimination. 
The problem is that most policing-disparity researchers do not 
have anything remotely approaching this dream data. While some 
neighborhood-level information is often available (more on this below), 
researchers generally have no access to any individual-level data on a 
random sample of the public. Rather, they have data from the criminal 
justice system, which covers only individuals the police have interacted 
with, and is far more limited in scope. For example, some police 
departments require officers to fill out forms documenting every 
pedestrian stop. These forms typically include basic demographic 
information, location, and the stated reasons for the stop, as well as the 
result of the stop (for example, whether an arrest was made).72 If 
researchers can access these forms, they can analyze the racial- and 
neighborhood-level distributions of police stops. 
But explaining those distributions is much harder. First, the forms 
do not give us any objective information about what stopped 
pedestrians were doing prior to the stop. The forms tell us only what 
the police officers wrote down, which may be a post hoc rationalization 
for the stop. In a study of whether stops are discriminatory, it is 
certainly not sound to assume that the very police officers being studied 
always record pedestrian behavior in an accurate, nondiscriminatory 
way. Second, and even more problematically, the forms provide no 
information whatsoever about persons who were not stopped by the 
police (or, for that matter, information about what the stoppees were 
doing at any time in the study period other than the moment they were 
stopped). So taken alone, the forms do not facilitate the kind of 
individual-level analysis discussed above. 
72 See, e.g., Robin S. Engel et al., Citizens' Demeanor, Race, and Traffic Stops, in RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 287, 289. 
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Nor, typically, is there any other available source of individual-
level information about criminal behavior (much less suspicious but 
noncriminal behavior) that could be linked to police outcome data. In 
terms of public records, at most, one might imagine being able to link 
some sort of public database that includes citizens' residences and 
demographics with their official criminal records; obtaining access to 
even this sort of data would be difficult. In any event, official criminal 
records are a rather poor proxy for actual criminality. Mter all, the vast 
majority of crimes are never detected and never enter the criminal 
justice system. For example, surveys suggest there are hundreds of 
millions of drug crimes in the U.S. each year, but only about 1.5 million 
drug arrests. 73 Even most reported violent and property crimes go 
unsolved.74 Moreover, even for cases that are in the system, we again 
lack objective conduct measures-we know only what people were 
arrested for, convicted of, and so forth. But again, these measures may 
themselves be affected by police racial bias, and therefore treating 
them as conduct measures would introduce a troubling circularity to 
the analysis. 
For these reasons, researchers have rarely been able to conduct 
individual-level analyses of racial disparities in the likelihood of police 
interactions conditional on behavior and other potential confounders. 
There are, however, a couple of potentially promising ways that 
researchers could collect data to support such analyses. First, 
researchers could conduct surveys about criminal conduct and police 
interactions. A survey could, in principle, ask individuals for much of.. ... 
the individual-level information described above. Respondents could 
plausibly be expected to provide rough estimates of the amounts of time 
each day that they typically spend engaged in various activities, to 
recall specific police interactions reasonably accurately, and to describe 
their participation m cnmes, including how often they carry 
contraband. 
73 See OFF. OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POL 'y, FACT SHEET: 2010 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG 
USE AND HEALTH (Sept. 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/ondcp/Fact_Sheets/ 
nsduh_fact_sheet_9-7-11_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BXE9-HP2F] (use rates). For arrest rates, see 
Arrest Data Analysis Tool, supra note 1. See also Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http: //www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafetylimpaired_driving I 
impaired-drv_factsheet.html [https://perma.cc!SJR7-25Y8] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (finding one 
percent arrested out of 112 million self-reported drunk-driving instances each year). 
74 Nationally, approximately twenty percent of reported property crimes and forty-five 
percent of reported violent crimes are cleared. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, OFFENSES 
CLEARED (Fall 2015), https: //www .tbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime· in-the-u.s/20 14/crime-in-the-u.s.-
20 14/offenses-known-ta-la w -enforcement /clearances/man/clearances. pdf [https: //perma.cc /P88U-
6KN3]. 
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A number of large national surveys already collect detailed 
information about criminal incidents, including demographic 
information. Some surveys, such as the Census Bureau's National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS),75 gather data from victims, 
including information on police disposition of incidents. This approach 
allows assessment of racial disparities in police response to reported 
crimes, but it is not useful for victimless crimes such as drug crimes, 
and provides no information about how police respond to individuals 
who are not committing crimes. Other surveys ask individuals to self-
report crimes, like drug use76 (and occasionally drug delivery). 77 Self-
report surveys are potentially a good match for the kinds of analysis 
described above, because they produce individual-level samples 
including people with no criminal conduct and with no police contacts. 
Such surveys do not always also ask about police interactions, but 
they could, and some do. A few researchers have used local youth-
cohort surveys that ask such questions to assess racial and other 
disparities. 78 The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)79 
asks about the respondent's arrest history in the past year, although 
this variable has often been ignored in studies using the data.80 Useful 
75 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (ON BEHALF OF THE BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS), NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2014), http://www .bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ncvs2_2014.pdf [https: //perma. 
cc/YF4N-Q27G]. 
76 See LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, MONITORING THE FUTURE, 
NATIONAL SURVEY RESULTS ON DRUG USE, 1975-2013: VOLUME I, 9 (2014), http:// 
monitoringthefuture.org 1/pubs/monographs/mtf-voll_20 13. pdf [https: //perma.cc /D5D7-BSR4]; 
DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND 
HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default!files/ 
NSD UHresultsPD FWHTML20 13!W eb/NSD UHresults20 13. pdf [https: //perma.cc /L9N8-3 7UE]. 
Drug use surveys find only minor racial differences, which scholars often contrast with large race 
gaps in drug arrests. E.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 6-7 (2010); Yonette F. 
Thomas, The Social Epidemiology of Drug Abuse, 32 AM. J. PREV. MED. Sl44 (2007); see also 
Christopher L. Griffin, Jr. et al., Corrections for Racial Disparities in Law Enforcement, 55 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 1365, 1381-82 (2014) (using surveys on DWis). 
77 Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota's Prison 
and Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 239-40 (2009) (finding somewhat higher drug sales 
rates among blacks); KATHERINE BECKETT ET AL., ACLU, RACE AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT IN 
SEATTLE 42 (2008) https: //www .aclu.org lfiles/assets/race20and20drug20law20enforcement20in 
20seattle_2008l.pdf [https://perma.cc/NX2T-2XDG] (using data on drug delivery from study 
conducted at needle exchange). 
78 David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Arrest, 45 
DEMOGRAPHY 55 (2008); Robert J. Sampson, Effects of Socioeconomic Context on Official Reaction 
to Juvenile Delinquency, 51 AM. Soc. REV. 876 (1986). 
79 See supra note 73. 
80 Criminology studies using the NSDUH have usually used its drug use figures as an out-of-
sample benchmark to compare other arrest data to. E.g., Holly Nguyen & Peter Reuter, How Risky 
Is Marijuana Possession? Considering the Role of Age, Race, and Gender, 58 CRIME & DELINQ. 879 
(2012). But public health and medical researchers have used the NSDUH arrest data to assess 
racial disparities; such research often is not framed in "policing disparity" terms per se (instead 
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expansions could include questions about other interactions such as 
stops, frisks, and searches; ask more comprehensive questions about 
non-drug criminal conduct; and sample persons recently incarcerated 
(who are currently excluded, potentially introducing sample selection 
bias). 81 
Still, there are limitations to this approach. Surveys are expensive, 
and the existing large national surveys' samples are not designed to 
produce valid local estimates, so collecting information about particular 
police departments' practices would require substantial new 
undertakings.82 In addition, crime surveys raise concerns about 
accuracy, 83 and these would be exacerbated if they asked for very fine-
grained information-for example, detailed accounts of each day's 
activities. Moreover, even if individuals report actual criminal conduct 
accurately, it is unrealistic to expect individuals to accurately self-
appraise and remember whether they were at any given time engaging 
in "suspicious" conduct-moving "furtively," for instance. Rather than 
measuring such factors directly, researchers would realistically have to 
rely on an assumption that respondents' reports of actual criminal 
conduct are a good proxy for behavior giving rise to reasonable 
suspicion of criminal conduct-or at least that they are an equally good 
proxy across racial groups. 
Another possible approach is for researchers to attempt to directly 
observe the criminal or suspicious behavior of individuals, as well as 
whether police stop them. A few prior policing-disparity studies have at 
least sought to observe the former. The seminal example was John 
Lamberth's 1994 New Jersey Turnpike study, in which researchers 
drove just over the speed limit and observed the drivers who passed 
treating arrest as simply a negative health/life outcome). Pacek et a!. find substantial racial 
disparities in the probability of arrest conditional on "disordered" marijuana use. Lauren R. Pacek 
et a!., Race/Ethnicity Differences Between Alcohol, Marijuana, and Co-Occurring Alcohol and 
Marijuana Use Disorders and Their Association with Public Health and Social Problems Using a 
National Sample, 21 AM. J. ADDICT. 435, 437 (2012). Burns et a!. use the data to draw share 
comparisons between drug buys, drug use, and drug arrests. Rachel M. Burns et a!., Statistics on 
Cannabis Users Skew Perceptions of Cannabis Use, 2013 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 4 tbl.2. 
81 Under current NSDUH methodology, recently-incarcerated persons are not surveyed, 
which may introduce sample selection bias. If black drug arrestees are more likely to be 
incarcerated (as many studies indicate), excluding incarcerated persons would downward-bias 
estimates of racial disparity in arrest rates. 
82 BRIAN WIERSEMA, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM ON VIOLENCE RESEARCH, AREA-IDENTIFIED 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY DATA 1 (1999); Dep't Health and Human Servs., 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Admin., State Estimates of Substance Abuse from the 2006-
07 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health 7-9 (2009). 
83 See BARRY SPUNT, SELF-REPORT SURVEYS, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
1465, 1465-67 (David Levinson ed. 2002); Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Minority Arrest: A 
Note on What Has Been Said and How It Fits Together, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 29, 42-45 (1997). 
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them.84 Subsequent highway studies have used radar.85 Other 
researchers have physically observed traffic violations on city streets, 86 
or used video cameras in a store to observe shoplifting.87 In none of 
these studies, however, did researchers seek to observe policing 
outcomes for the same individuals being observed. That is presumably 
because doing so would have massively magnified projects that were 
already resource-intensive-police stop only a tiny percentage of 
speeders, for instance, so obtaining a sample that provided sufficient 
statistical power to study stop outcomes would require having 
observers in place for a very long time. 
That being said, in some contexts it might be possible to physically 
observe all the necessary data for a sufficient sample. For example, 
such studies could be carried out at immigration, airport security, or 
other law enforcement checkpoints (optimally with the agency's 
cooperation). Researchers could record the behavior of individuals 
passing through, demographics, whether the individual has 
companions, flight origin and destination, number and type of bags, 
plus any computer database information that agents observe when they 
run the traveler's identification through the system. They could then 
record what the agents do: for example, diversion for additional 
searches. This approach would be a straightforward expansion of self-
studies that agencies have already carried out.88 
Still, the prospects of this approach are limited to contexts where 
both the individual conduct and the police conduct in question are 
84 State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 351 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1996); JOHN LAMBERTH, REVISED 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENCE OF POLICE STOPS AND ARRESTS OF BLACK 
DRIVERS/TRAVELERS ON THE NEW JERSEY TURNPIKE BETWEEN EXITS OR INTERCHANGES 1 AND 3 
FROM THE YEARS 1988 THROUGH 1991 (Nov. 11, 1994). 
85 See James E. Lange et al., Testing the Racial Profiling Hypothesis for Seemingly Disparate 
Stops on the New Jersey Turnpike, 22 JUST. Q. 193, 211-12 (2005); ROBIN S. ENGEL ET AL., 
PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, PROJECT ON POLICE-CITIZEN CONTACTS, YEAR 2 FINAL REPORT (MAY 
2003-APRIL 2004) 64-65, 110 (2005). 
88 Geoffrey P. Alpert et al., Investigating Racial Profiling by the Miami-Dade Police 
Department: A Multimethod Approach, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL 'y 25, 36, 41-44 (2007) (finding 
no unjustified racial disparity in stops). 
87 Dean A. Dabney et al., Who Actually Steals? A Study of Covertly Observed Shoplifters, 21 
JUST. Q. 693, 711 (2004). One concern about this study is that its analysis confusingly estimates 
shoplifting rates after controlling for behaviors (e.g., product-tampering) that seem to be part of 
the shoplifting conduct itself. 
88 Federal agencies have conducted studies designed to produce benchmarks for comparisons 
to agency data on the demographic distribution of persons passing through checkpoint stops. 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 196855, ASSESSING MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES FOR 
IDENTIFYING RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER: OBSERVATION-BASED DATA COLLECTION IN AIRPORTS 
AND AT IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/amtireg.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QP6A-LMT6]. The border control checkpoint study merely recorded the race of 
those passing through (a population benchmark), while the airport security checkpoint study 
recorded some additional information such as gender, age, and number of carry-ons. 
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expected to take place in known places and times where researchers or 
cameras can be stationed. Most crime and most police interactions, 
however, are less predictable, and surveys will be the only plausible 
source of individual-level data. In practice, given the demands of either 
method, we can expect that in most policing contexts, it will remain 
very difficult to carry out observational studies of policing disparities 
that seek to measure and control for differences in individual behavior. 
B. Neighborhood-Level Analyses 
Suppose you had a more limited objective: to assess only the inter-
neighborhood dimension of possible police racial discrimination. Do 
police treat neighborhoods of color differently because of their racial 
composition? Regression analysis could seek to answer this question by 
regressing neighborhood stop rates on measures of racial composition 
(for instance, the black population share) as well as plausible 
neighborhood-level confounding variables-that is, nonracial reasons 
that police might treat different neighborhoods differently. 
It is typically possible to construct datasets to support this kind of 
analysis, and researchers have done so. An important example was the 
study of precinct-level disparities presented by the plaintiffs' expert, 
Jeffrey Fagan, in the Floyd stop-and-frisk case against the NYPD.89 
Fagan regressed precinct stop rates on racial groups' population shares; 
controls included crime complaint rates, neighborhood socioeconomic 
and other demographic characteristics, and size of the precinct's police 
force. 90 The report found that black and Hispanic population share--
strongly predicted stop rates, 91 and the district court agreed.92 
Highly localized demographic and socioeconomic data are readily 
available (from the Census Bureau and other sources), but what about 
crime data? Various crime statistics can also readily be obtained at 
local levels (e.g., the precinct), but how well do these approximate rates 
of actual crime, or for that matter, rates of "suspicious behavior?" 
89 Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D., 30-34, Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 08 Civ. 01034). 
00 Id. The force size control means that the model does not test discrimination in allocation of 
police among precincts. An alternative model omitted this control, and estimated larger race gaps. 
Id. at 36. 
91 Id. at 32-34. The plaintiffs' additional multilevel models assessed racial disparities within 
precincts as well. Id. at 40-45. These models do not have individual-level controls for crime or 
other confounders, which weakens their causal identification. However, because NYPD was 
overwhelmingly stopping innocent people, the absence of crime controls may not be seriously 
problematic; see supra note 55. 
92 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 560. 
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Some scholars have used arrest rates to stand in for crime rates, 
but this really should be avoided, because it again introduces 
circularity.93 Arrests are discretionary police decisions, and thus could 
be infected by racial discrimination. When arrests are used as a crime 
measure in stop-disparity studies, what is really being asked is not 
"Does crime explain stop disparities?" but "How do stop disparities 
compare to arrest disparities?" 
A much better option is to control for the neighborhood's reported 
crime rates, which principally come from calls made by citizens.94 But 
this approach still faces the problem that most crime is unreported-
about half of violent crimes and sixty percent of property crimes, 
according to victim surveys,95 while minor or victimless crimes are 
almost never reported. 96 And reported crime might not be a race-neutral 
(or neighborhood-neutral) proxy for actual crime, potentially biasing 
analyses. This concern is amplified because (due to the extreme 
underreporting of other crime types) reported-crime benchmarks are 
usually based on the FBI's serious "index crimes,"97 violent crimes, or 
just homicide.98 But racial differences in crime rates are believed to be 
far greater for violent crime, especially homicide, than for other 
crimes.99 If police stops are driven substantially by more minor crimes, 
93 E.g., Jeffrey A. Fagan et al., Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited, in RACE, 
ETHNJCITY, AND POLICING, supra note 8, at 318-19; Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the 
NYPD's Stop-and-Frisk Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. Assoc. 
813, 818-20 (2007). 
94 The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) provide summary data for certain crimes, but 
only collects race information for homicides. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNJTED STATES 2014, OFFENSES 
KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT (Fall 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/main/offenses-known-to-law-
enforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BMY-6BBN]. Some agencies participate in the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes suspect race. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FBI, 
NATIONAL INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM, VOLUME 1: DATA COLLECTION GUIDELINES 63--B4 
(2000), http: //www2.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/manuals/v1all.pdf [https: //perma.cc/E7K5-CYH5). Some 
studies use crime-report data from local sources. E.g., HOWARD P. GREENWALD ET AL., FINAL 
REPORT: POLICE VEHICLE STOPS IN SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNJA 16--18 (2001); GREG RIDGEWAY, 
RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S STOP, 
QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES 13 (2006). 
95 JENNJFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 235508, CRIMINAL 
VICTIMIZATION, 2010, 1 (Sept. 2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflcv10.pdf 
[https: //perma.cc nCEQ-JVMM]. 
96 Sampson & Lauritsen, supra note 53, at 317. 
97 The Uniform Crime Reports crime index includes murder, rape, arson, larceny, robbery, 
burglary, car theft, and aggravated assault. FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2014, EXPANDED 
OFFENSE DATA (Fall 20 15), https: //www .fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2014/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-offense/expanded-offense/expanded-
offense-data. pdf [https: //perma.cc /NFU8-9FXK]. 
98 E.g., Fagan et al., supra note 93, at 318-19 (using homicide); RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at 
xii, 16--19 (using violent crime). 
99 Frase, supra note 77, at 238. 
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using reported violent-crime rates as a proxy for all crime risks 
substantially overstating the extent to which crime differences explain 
stop disparities across neighborhoods. 
Arguably, for the purpose of assessing police discrimination, 
reported crime measures could be the right benchmark despite the 
enormous amount of crime that gets left out of them, because "the 
criminal justice process does not begin until the police become aware of 
a crime."100 That is, if you are trying to model the inputs into police 
decision-making, you should not worry about the crime that the police 
never hear about. This point is probably overstated, because in many 
cities, a large fraction of policing is not report-driven at all, but 
proactive-for example, patrol officers walking or driving the streets 
looking for suspicious activity. 101 Still, surely police departments' 
approaches to different neighborhoods are at least somewhat influenced 
by reported crime levels. So reported-crime measures are probably 
essential to include m neighborhood-level analyses of police 
discrimination, and they are perhaps defensible proxies for 
unmeasured (but observable-to-police) suspicious or criminal activity as 
well. Researchers should, however, be cognizant of their limitations and 
possible biases. 
C. Studies of Post-Stop Outcomes 
While individual-level analyses of disparities in police stops have 
been almost nonexistent, individual-level data have often been used to 
study disparities in searches, arrests, or other sanctions among stopped 
persons.l02 These studies are made possible by the data that many 
police departments require officers to collect on those they stop. On the 
surface, these studies are more straightforward than attempts to 
estimate stop disparities, because for each stopped individual, it 
appears possible to observe all the key variables: what they were 
stopped for, demographics, where the stop occurred, how they acted, 
and the outcome of the stop. However, these studies raise substantial 
causal inference challenges. 
First, if there is racial discrimination in initial stops, the samples 
of stopped persons of different races differ in unobservable ways, 
introducing sample selection bias. For example, consider Smith and 
100 Garland et al., supra note 50, at 19-20, 
101 See RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at 18 (finding thirty percent of NYPD stops were initiated by 
citizen calls or suspect descriptions). 
102 E.g., Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 9--19; Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 45, at 
192-98; Greg Ridgeway, Assessing the Effect of Race Bias in Post-Traffic Stop Outcomes Using 
Propensity Scores, 22 J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (2006). 
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Petrocelli's study of Richmond traffic stops, which found that after 
controlling for observable differences, stopped minority drivers were 
substantially less likely to be ticketed or arrested. 103 The authors offer 
two possible interpretations of their finding: first, that police 
discriminated in favor of minorities, 104 or second, that they sanctioned 
minorities less often because more minorities had been unjustifiably 
stopped.l05 Notice that these interpretations are effectively opposite, 
and choosing between them reqmres assumptions about stop 
decisions. 106 
Second, these studies have often provided good illustrations of how 
challenging it is to specify a model properly, including appropriate 
control variables but not inappropriate ones. Studies of post-stop 
disparities often include control variables that risk filtering out part of 
the police discrimination that the study is trying to measure. For 
example, analyses of search rates often control for whether the 
individual is arrested or sanctioned. 107 The apparent rationale is that 
arrests and sanctions reflect conduct, or that searches incident to arrest 
are not discretionary. 108 But arrest and sanction decisions are 
themselves discretionary. Moreover, some arrests result from searches, 
not vice-versa, or may be motivated by the desire to carry out a search. 
When studying search decisions, it is inappropriate to control for 
something that is itself shaped by the search decision; doing so likely 
biases estimates of unexplained disparity downward. These examples 
illustrate that concerns about omitted variable bias cannot simply be 
solved by a kitchen-sink approach to constructing a model-that is, 
more control variables are not always better. If one is trying to study 
police racial discrimination, variables likely to be influenced by that 
very discrimination are ''bad controls." 
103 Michael R. Smith & Matthew Petrocelli, Racial Profiling? A Multivariate Analysis of 
Traffic Stop Data, 4 POLICE Q. 4, 18-20 (2001). 
104 Id. The researchers posit that officers, aware that the research study was taking place, 
may have altered their behavior when interacting with black drivers to avoid accusations of 
racism. 
105 Id. 
106 A similar problem arises in studies of disparities in later process stages, such as sentencing 
or plea-bargaining. Most such studies compound the problem by using samples consisting only of 
sentenced cases and controlling for conviction severity, failing to account for disparities in charging 
and plea-bargaining, in addition to police decision-making. See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, 
Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 39-77 (2013) (explaining this 
problem). 
107 See, e.g., Alpert et al., supra note 86, at 46-47 (controlling for whether the individual is 
arrested); Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 9-19 (controlling for the number of violations). 
108 See Pickerill et al., supra note 34, at 15. 
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That said, these research design choices are not always easy. 
Consider the dilemma of whether to control for behavior recorded by 
officers on stop forms. As discussed in Part I, officers' decisions about 
what to write down could likewise be affected by race. Scholars have 
nonetheless often included officers' descriptions as control variables, 
implicitly treating them as accurate, exogenous descriptions of behavior 
rather than as discretionary decisions. For example, a Cleveland study 
found that arrest disparities disappeared after controlling for whether 
police described drivers as noncompliant or disrespectful. 109 The RAND 
study of NYPD's frisk, search, and sanction rates controlled for 
"evasiveness, ... wearing clothes consistent with those commonly used 
in crime, making furtive movements, acting in a manner consistent 
with a drug transaction or a violent crime, or having a suspicious 
bulge."110 
Other studies exclude such subjective factors from their models. I 
believe this is the better choice, at least for factors that are easy to 
manipulate. However, it does risk omitted-variable bias, because at 
least sometimes the officers' descriptions presumably will be grounded 
in actual conduct. There are no perfect choices. Ideally, researchers 
should investigate whether their estimates are affected by alternative 
choices on difficult model specification questions. Careful observational 
studies of stops as well as post-stop outcomes are potentially 
informative, but researchers must remember their limits. 
D. Exploiting Variations in Enforcers' Information About Rae~ 
Alternatively, instead of simply trying to measure and control for 
all confounding variables, researchers sometimes look for quasi-
experimental approaches-that is, approaches that exploit natural 
shocks to the treatment variable. While race itself is not subject to such 
shocks, officers' perception of race sometimes is, and a few studies have 
taken advantage of this fact. If racial disparity increases when officers 
are likelier to know an individual's race, this increase can reasonably 
be attributed to discrimination, assuming this change in knowledge is 
not also accompanied by changes in other relevant factors. 
Several studies have compared officers' traffic enforcement 
decisions to truly race-blind mechanisms: traffic-camera citationslll 
109 Engel et al., supra note 72, at 297-99. 
110 Ridgeway, supra note 102, at 34-35. 
111 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEP'T OF POLICE, TRAFFIC STOP DATA ANALYSIS: THIRD REPORT 
(2002). 
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and citations issued via aerial surveillance.l12 These are very 
informative designs, analogous to strong studies on other 
discrimination questions-for example, research demonstrating 
increased hiring of women when orchestras adopted blind auditions. 113 
A limitation is that race information is not the only difference between 
the human and the automated decision processes: automated and aerial 
enforcement target only a subset of the violation types that human 
officers respond to. 114 
Several traffic-stop studies have exploited variation in race 
information known to officers, on the theory that a driver's race is 
harder to see at night. The studies compare stops at the same clock 
time but on either side of Daylight Savings Time transitions, which 
changes whether night has fallen. The intuition is that if racial 
disparity is driven by discrimination, it should be reduced at night. 
Studies in Portland and Cincinnati found no such reduction, concluding 
that disparities were not caused by racial discrimination. 115 Studies in 
Minneapolis and Syracuse reached the opposite conclusion; the 
Syracuse study, unlike the others, accounted for variations in artificial 
light. 116 
One interpretive problem is that police and drivers may behave 
differently when it is dark for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
reduction in police ability to perceive drivers' race. If so, the research 
design does not allow these race-neutral reasons to be disentangled 
from the reduced race information. Darkness certainly affects driving 
behavior, and could also affect police tactics, or police perceptions of 
black criminality_117 
Still, these studies are very clever and represent some of the 
strongest observational research on policing disparity, and the general 
strategy of exploiting variations in race information is promising. 
112 E.H. McConnell & AR. Scheidegger, Race and Speeding Citations: Comparing Speeding 
Citations Issued by Air Traffic Officers With Those Issued by Ground Traffic Officers, ANN. MTG. 
ACAD. CRIM. JUST. SCI. (2001). 
113 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind" 
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 715, 737-38 (2000). 
114 See Ridgeway & MacDonald, supra note 45, at 183 (citing these studies and raising this 
concern). 
115 Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops from 
Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 878 (2006); TERRY SCHELL ET AL., RAND CORP., 
POLICE-COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN CINCINNATI: YEAR THREE EVALUATION REPORT 27 (2007). 
116 Joseph A Ritter & David Bael, Detecting Racial Profiling in Minneapolis Traffic Stops: A 
New Approach, CURA REPORTER (Spring/Summer 2009) at 11-17; William C. Horrace & Shawn 
M. Rohlin, How Dark Is Dark? Bright Lights, Big City, Racial Profiling, 98 REV. ECON. & STATS. 
226, 231 (May 2016). 
117 In general, fear of crime is dramatically higher at night. E.g., Kathleen A Fox et al., 
Gender, Crime Victimization, and Fear of Crime, 22 SECURITY J. 24, 35 (2009). 
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However, the potential of this research design is limited to narrow 
contexts: those in which enforcement decisions can be made without 
close-range observation of suspects. 
E. Lab Experiments on Implicit Biases 
Aside from these observational approaches, many lab experiments 
demonstrate the prevalence of "implicit racial bias," including 
association of blackness with criminality.l18 For example, Eberhardt et 
al. showed that police subjects who were primed subconsciously with 
crime-related images paid disproportionate attention to black faces. 119 
A subset of this literature tests "shooter bias," using computer 
simulations; subjects are asked to "shoot" armed characters. These 
tests find that players pick the right response faster if the image 
matches stereotypes (e.g., armed black characters).l20 
These studies are randomized experiments-the "gold standard" 
for causal inference. Many are quite small. But outside the lab, 
Internet-administered implicit bias tests have been taken by millions of 
people. Some test the association between blackness and weapons, 
which is prevalent: one analysis found that seventy-two percent of 
respondents showed this association, and only nine percent showed the 
reverse. 121 Internet administration means test-taking conditions and 
samples are not controlled and respondents are not blind to the study's 
purpose. But people who choose to test themselves might be less biased · 
than average (although this is speculative, of course), and most· 
respondents are presumably trying to achieve an "unbiased" score. 
This research strongly indicates that implicit racial bias is 
prevalent among police-but not limited to them. Police and civilian 
subjects score similarly, and on some tasks police make fewer mistakes 
118 See, e.g., B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias, 15 CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCH. SCI. 287 (2006) 
(reviewing literature); Quillian, supra note 61, at 314-20 (same); CHERYL STAATS, KIRWAN 
INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 2014, http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/wp-
content/u ploads/20 14/03/2014-implicit-bias. pdf [https: //perma .cc /J 5AP-BFY 4] (same). 
119 Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 876, 885-88 (2004) (also finding that crime-primed officers were more 
likely to wrongly pick a more racially "stereotypical" black face out of a lineup); Heather M Kleider 
et al., Looking Like a Criminal, 40 MEMORY & COGNITION 1200, 1200 (2012) (reaching similar 
findings with student subjects). 
120 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in 
the Decision to Shoot, 8 Soc. & PERS. PSYCH. COMPASS 201, 206-07 (2014); Anthony G. Greenwald 
et al., Targets of Discrimination: Effect of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders, 39 J. EXPER. 
Soc. PSYCH. 399, 401-03 (2003). 
121 Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 
2007 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCH. 1, 20 (2007). 
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overall. 122 As Tonry puts it, given the bias found among "every 
imaginable group in the population, it would be remarkable if criminal 
justice practitioners were not affected."123 Surveys have also shown 
widespread tendencies to explicitly associate blackness with 
criminality, 124 and overt endorsement of racial discrimination among a 
small but nontrivial subset of white respondents.l25 
The great unknown is how implicit bias affects real-world police 
decisions. 126 A key next step is to link implicit bias scores to real-world 
policing outcomes-for example, within police departments, do 
individual officers' scores tend to predict racial disparity in their stop 
rates? If so, it would support police efforts to reduce implicit bias, 
perhaps via "debiasing" trainings or by using implicit bias testing in 
hiring.l27 If not, it might suggest that the recent focus by many 
departments and researchers on implicit bias (rather than explicit bias 
or behavior) is misguided. Such studies would have limitations: while 
the tests are controlled experiments, using their results to explain real-
world outcomes involves the usual causal-inference challenges of 
observational research. For example, an officer's experiences could 
influence both her implicit bias scores and her stop practices. Still, such 
studies could be a promising approach to assessing one plausible 
mechanism for disparities. 
III. AUDITING: A FIELD EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH 
As the review in the last Part suggests, evaluating police racial 
discrimination is truly difficult, and despite decades of serious effort, 
our existing tools have serious shortcomings. Most observational 
methods suffer from data shortcomings and causal inference 
challenges; quasi-experimental methods are of limited applicability; 
122 Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the 
Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 1006; see generally Correll et al., supra note 
120, at 206. 
123 Michael Tonry, The Social, Psychological, and Political Causes of Racial Disparities in the 
American Criminal Justice System, 39 CRIME & JUST. 273, 287 (2010). 
124 James D. Unnever, Race, Crime, and Public Opinion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION 70, 71 (Sandra M. Bucerius & Michael Tonry eds. 2014). 
125 See, e.g., Frank Newport, In U.S., 87% Approve of Black- White Marriage, vs. 4% in 1958, 
GALLUP (July 25, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163697/approve-marriage-blacks-whites.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/Y825-JAL4] (reporting 2013 poll showing that only eighty-four percent of white 
Americans approve of interracial marriage). 
126 E.g., BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 72 ("[L]aboratory effects ... can rarely tell us the 
extent to which naturally observed disparities are the result of discrimination."). 
127 Caution is appropriate; due to random variation, any one individual's score may not mean 
much. However, this problem could probably be mitigated by using more extensive or repeated 
testing. 
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and lab research has uncertain implications for the "real world." 
Accordingly, I propose a new method to supplement the existing toolkit: 
the use of "testers," also known as "auditing." While the term "auditing" 
has various meanings in other contexts, in antidiscrimination research 
it is usually used to refer to field studies that compare the treatment of 
paired individuals ("testers") who are similar but for a specific 
characteristic such as race. Such methods are used often m 
discrimination research and civil rights law enforcement in areas such 
as employment, housing, and lending. I propose using testers (probably 
undercover police) to interact with police or to stage behavior that could 
attract their attention. Although it raises potential ethical, safety, 
legal, and political concerns, which I address here, this approach has 
substantial promise, capturing most of the advantages of lab 
experiments while directly testing real-world behavior. 
A. Auditing in Research and Civil Rights Enforcement 
A good example of the auditing approach is Ayres and Siegelman's 
study of race and sex discrimination by auto dealers.l28 The authors 
matched white male testers with black male, black female, and white 
female counterparts based on age, education, and assessed 
attractiveness. 129 The testers all wore similar clothing and drove 
similar cars to the dealerships, where they negotiated prices on cars; 
black testers got substantially worse offers. 130 Other studies have used 
auditing to study housing and employment markets, 131 in addition to· 
various other phenomena-for example, a recent study found that · 
drivers are less willing to yield to black jaywalkers. 132 
Some studies manipulate only written information, such as 
employment applications,133 student emails to professors, 134 and writing 
128 Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New 
Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995). 
129 Id. at 306. 
1
"
0 Id. at 319. The evidence of gender discrimination was less clear. 
m E.g., John Yinger, Measuring Discrimination with Fair Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 
76 AM. ECON. REV. 881 (1986); see BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 106-07 (reviewing housing 
research); P.A. Riach & J. Rich, Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place, 112 
ECON. J. F480, F510-F513 (2002) (same); Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies 
of Employment Discrimination, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 104, 114 (2007) (reviewing 
employment research); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. Soc. 937 (2003) 
(studying effects of criminal records and race on employment). 
132 Tara Goddard et a!., Racial Bias in Driver Yielding Behavior at Crosswalks, 33 
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART F 1, 5 (2015); see BLANK ET AL., supra note 37, at 104-08 
(reviewing auditing literature); Riach & Rich, supra note 131. 
133 E.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable 
than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 
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samples. 135 Such designs allow true experimental manipulation of race 
and gender, which in-person auditing does not quite achieve: one can 
randomize cases between testers, but one cannot make the same tester 
white in one case and black in another. Instead, in-person auditing 
depends on careful matching and training to minimize within-pair 
variation. 
No similar studies address U.S. law enforcement. In 1994, a 
criminal defendant introduced evidence from testers that he had hired 
to assess whether race affected Border Patrol stops. But the experiment 
was tiny, and the unpersuaded court observed that many conditions 
had not been held constant. 136 A Mexico City study used testers who 
committed illegal left turns to test socioeconomic status effects on police 
demands for bribes. 137 Another study focused on private party 
suspicions of crime, testing store clerks' reactions to white and black 
shoppers. 138 An ABC News mini-experiment likewise tested private 
observers: actors cut the lock off a bicycle, and passerby reactions to the 
black actor were much more hostile_139 
The use of testers is also a well-established civil rights enforcement 
strategy. In the 1950s, testers brought suits challenging public transit 
discrimination, and the Supreme Court held that testers could have 
standing. 140 Testers have played a prominent role in housing 
discrimination enforcement; the federal government has funded large 
tester studies and backed tester lawsuits brought by local fair housing 
associations.l41 Testers have also brought challenges to lending 
991 (2004); Pager, supra note 131, at 942-43 (reviewing studies). 
134 Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How 
Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway Into Organizations, 100 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1678, 1696--98 (2015). 
135 Arin N. Reeves, Nextions, Written in Black & White: Exploring Confirmation Bias in 
Racialized Perceptions of Writing Skills 4-6 (2014), http://www.nextions.com/wp-
content lfiles_mf/144682264 72014040114 WritteninBlackandWhite YPS. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9DHV-N2AN]. 
136 United States v. Beasley, 36 F.3d 1106, No. 94-2026, No. 94-2065 (lOth Cir. 1994) 
(unpublished table decision). 
137 Brian J. Fried et al., Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 
76 (2010). 
138 George E. Schreer et al., "Shopping While Black": Examining Racial Discrimination in a 
Retail Setting, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1432 (2009). 
139 What Would You Do? (Bike Thief) (ABC television broadcast 2010), 
http://www .youtube.com/watch?v=SOk V _b3IK9M [https:l/perma.cc/Z7ZS-E8N7]. 
140 Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958) (per curiam). 
141 See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that a tester could have 
standing if he could show actual injury); Michael Selmi, Public us. Private Enforcement of Civil 
Rights, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1401, 1426 (1998); MARGERY A. TURNER ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, 
DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 
2000 (2002). 
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discrimination, 142 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
has endorsed their use to challenge hiring discrimination, though few 
cases have been brought.l43 
B. Auditing the Police: Key Research Design Considerations 
Is auditing the police realistic? This has not been done before, 144 
and there are some good reasons for that-but I believe these concerns 
can be addressed with careful research design. Here, I address several 
objectives that researchers must balance: safety, legality, importance, 
methodological rigor, statistical power, and cost concerns. 
1. Safety. 
A paramount concern that will limit the potential scope of this 
approach is minimizing risk to testers, police, and third parties. The 
research designs I propose below involve no serious law-breaking, nor 
do they suggest a violent situation. They are not designed to test arrest 
probability, but to potentially elicit relatively minimal police 
interactions. Testers must be trained to be absolutely cooperative. The 
safest approach would involve law enforcement participation: voluntary 
or court-ordered police department self-monitoring or outside civil-
rights agency investigations. Ideally, testers could be undercover 
agents-people who regularly carry out far riskier work than this-and 
police backup could be ready to intervene if any safety threat arises. 
The designs proposed below also pose minimal risk to the officers 
being studied. With just one or two interactions with each officer, they 
would be used to diagnose broad patterns, not to identify individual 
''bad apples." They also involve very minimal officer time, mm1m1zmg 
distraction from ordinary public-safety duties. 
142 Steve Tomkowiak, Using Testing Evidence in Mortgage Lending Discrimination Cases, 41 
URB. LAW. 319, 326-36 (2009). 
143 EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N., DEC. NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
WHETHER "TESTERS" CAN FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
(May 22, 1996); Marc Bendick, Jr. & Ana P. Nunes, Developing the Research Basis for Controlling 
Bias in Hiring, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 238, 256 (2012). 
144 Indeed, aside from the Beasley defendant's effort, see supra note 136, it has hardly been 
suggested. One scholarly piece and one news article each give the idea a sentence or two. Pamela 
S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2008 
(1998); Emily Badger, Why It's So Hard to Study Racial Profiling By Police, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 
20 14), https: //www. washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/20 14/04/30/it-is-exceptionally-hard- to-get-
good-data -on-racial-bias- in-policing I [https: //perma .cc /EE24-NTP3]. Reviews of methods for 
studying racial profiling omit it; for example, Blank et al. don't mention auditing in their chapter 
on police, even though they endorse it for other contexts like housing. BLANKET AL., supra note 37, 
at 103-17, 186-202. 
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2. Legality. 
The criminal law constrains staging of actual crimes, lying to the 
police, and recording of interactions. 145 This is another advantage of 
governmental involvement. Undercover police routinely participate in 
otherwise-criminal activity and enjoy effective immunity from 
prosecution. 146 Private testers cannot be asked to commit serious 
crimes, but might choose to risk minor violations, as did researchers in 
several studies mentioned above: Lamberth's Turnpike study, 147 the 
jaywalking study,148 and the Mexico City bribery study. 149 Most of the 
designs proposed below involve no lawbreaking or lying, just potentially 
suspicious activity. 
3. Importance. 
Studies should focus on contexts in which there is reason to suspect 
discrimination (for example, large raw disparities, or citizen 
complaints) and in which discrimination would have meaningful 
consequences. But such contexts need not involve serious crimes. 
Misdemeanor enforcement can result in detention and substantial 
collateral consequences, can be highly stressful, may be a pretext to 
look for more serious criminality, 150 and may be a method of expanding 
the surveillance "net," exposing arrestees to more police interactions in 
the future.l 51 
4. Methodological rigor. 
The most obvious requirement for effective auditing is that the 
deception must work. The interaction should thus be quite ordinary, 
brief, and forgettable. Observations should be distributed across police 
145 In most states, anyone may record their own interactions without permission, though some 
states require two-party consent. REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
REPORTER'S RECORDING GUIDE 2-3 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/RECORDING.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3FUZ-UX8X]. There may also be a constitutional right to record police, e.g., Glik 
v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82-84 (1st Cir. 2011), though some courts have found only a right to 
openly record the police, Crawford v. Geiger, 996 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614-15 (N.D. Ohio 2014). 
146 Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 157, 165--69 (2009). 
147 LAMBERTH, supra note 84. 
148 Goddard et al., supra note 132. 
149 Fried et al., supra note 137. 
150 See supra note 16 (discussing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). Arrestees may 
be searched without warrants. 
151 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
611, 632-33, 639 (2014). 
485] TESTING RACIAL PROFILING 523 
beats and shifts and across time, so individual officers are unlikely to 
notice patterns. 
The primary threat to causal inference from auditing studies is 
tester heterogeneity, 152 so testers should be matched carefully_153 Subtle 
differences may remain, but training combined with simple, easy-to-
replicate "scripts" can make these less likely to affect outcomes. 
Analyses could focus on outcomes, like whether any interaction occurs 
that is unaffected by subtle differences in conversational styles. 
Optimally, the testers should be blind to the study's purpose (for 
example, they could be told they are testing enforcement without 
mentioning the racial dimension), 154 though this might be hard to pull 
off. But testers' activities could be recorded and later coded by persons 
who are blind to the purpose. 
One possible interpretive challenge is discerning whether racial 
differences in police actions might result from disparities in citizens' 
calls to the police, rather than police discrimination. With police 
department cooperation, this mechanism could be teased out, because 
the police could collect information on citizen calls. 
5. Statistical power and cost. 
The sample size must provide sufficient statistical power to 
produce reasonably precise estimates.l55 Ideally, this means at least 
hundreds of observations156-a plausible number (large cities have 
thousands of officers), provided the tests are spread across beats and 
shifts.l57 Many published auditing studies have much smaller samples, 
152 See, e.g., James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 108-09 
(1998). 
153 See Pager, supra note 131, at 111-12, 123-24. But researchers should avoid too-perfect 
matches on traits that themselves signify race (e.g., hair). See Riach & Rich, supra note 131, at 
F483-F484. 
154 See, e.g., Ayres & Siegelman, supra note 128, at 307 (using blind testers). 
155 Power analyses are typically framed in terms of hypothesis-testing, wherein power is the 
probability of obtaining a statistically significant result if the "true" effect is of a certain size. 
Power depends on sample size, the size of effect one seeks to detect, the statistical significance 
threshold, and (for binary outcomes) the baseline frequency of the outcomes. 
156 Sample-size calculators are widely available; they require assumptions about effect size. 
For example, if one seeks eighty percent power with a ninety-five confidence level, assuming the 
true probabilities for the two groups are thirty percent and forty percent respectively, a common 
power formula requires a total sample size of 708. See Power (Sample Size) Calculators, SEALED 
ENVELOPE, h ttps: //www. sealeden velope.com/power/binary -superiority/ [https: //perma.cc /G P73-
55UV] (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). If the probabilities were thirty percent and fifty percent, the 
sample size required would be smaller (182). 
157 For example, the Chicago police department has 279 distinct beats, each patrolled by eight 
or nine officers. Beat Officers, CHI. POLICE DEP'T, http://home.chicagopolice.org/get-involved-with-
caps/how-caps-works/beat-officers/ [https: //perma.cc /AG4B-YYNR]. 
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allowing them to detect only large effects, and even then, imprecisely. 158 
Although larger samples produce greater power, they cost more, and 
may increase the risk of police noticing patterns. This is another reason 
to use designs that involve low-intensity, brief, forgettable 
interactions-they can be repeated more often at reasonable cost. 
C. Possible Research Designs 
Here, I list a few examples of research designs, leaving the details 
to be tailored to the city and police force. 
Open Container I Minor in Possession. Testers could walk past beat 
officers carrying a container of liquid, such as a soda bottle that 
resembles a beer bottle, testing whether they are asked what is in it. If 
the containers do not actually contain alcohol, suspicion could be 
immediately dispelled. 
Loitering. Testers, in same-race pairs, could hang out in public, 
testing whether police approach. To increase rates of police 
interactions, testers could engage in further "nuisance" activity, like 
playing music or smoking, or wear bulky clothing. 
Casing. Testers could wait outside jewelry or other stores, looking 
in-behavior that could be construed either as "window-shopping" or 
"casing." 
Bike or Car Theft. Testers could break a bike lock or break into a 
car using a coat hanger-like the ABC News video described above, 159 
but larger-scale. In the car example, testers could carry the registration 
so as to dispel suspicion quickly. A challenge will be objectively 
differentiating hostile interactions from offers to help. 
Traffic Violations. Testers could break traffic laws and see if they 
get stopped (and searched). While safety would be a concern, some 
traffic violations could pose little or no danger-for example, expired or 
missing license plates. 
Checkpoints. Checkpoints are promising settings for auditing: some 
law enforcement contact is guaranteed, the location is fixed, the setting 
is highly monitored and low-risk, and the testers' activity (just passing 
through) would be unremarkable. 160 Outcomes to be measured could 
include time elapsed during an encounter or the rate of diversion for 
158 E.g., Fried et al., supra note 137, at 83 (42 tests); Schreer et al., supra note 138, at 1438 
(thirty-three tests, six stores). 
159 Supra note 139. 
160 Cf. supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing observational checkpoint studies). 
Testers would have some advantages versus other approaches to studying checkpoints, in that one 
can easily hold constant subtle behaviors or differences in verbal responses that might be difficult 
for observational researchers to measure and code. 
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extra searches. Agency cooperation, while not essential, would help; it 
would allow access to the information agents obtain when they run 
individuals' identification. 
Manipulation of Victim Reports, Police Files, and Training 
Exercises. Other strategies could avoid in-person police encounters. 
''Victims" (perhaps themselves of varied race) could call in crime 
reports with varied suspect race, to test differences in dispatchers' 
response (assuming a mechanism is in place to quickly cancel the 
investigation). Race could be manipulated in training exercises 
involving assessment of case files or descriptions. Manipulation of 
police files could also be used to test prosecutors' charging or intake 
decisions. 
Responding to Citizen Complaints. Officers that staff citizen 
outreach or internal affairs departments could be tested to see if they 
respond differently to complaints about officers depending on the 
complainant's race. 161 The test should focus on initial intake, with' a 
mechanism for stopping the ensuing investigations. 
D. Advantages and Limitations 
In real life, race mediates the lives people lead, but auditing 
measures disparate treatment of individuals who are doing the same 
thing in the same places. This is both a strength and a limitation. On 
the one hand, it enables sound causal inferences: if we eliminate 
differences other than race, we can more confidently attribute disparate 
outcomes to racial discrimination. Auditing designs would be much 
better tailored to isolate the effects of racial discrimination than 
regression studies and other observational approaches. If testers are 
matched and trained well, it could approximate a true experiment, but 
in a real-life setting, not a labJ62 
The downside is that auditing may miss dimensions of real-world 
racial discrimination. For example, if the police heavily target young 
men who dress a certain way, and virtually all such young men are 
black, perhaps clothing style is not a confounder that should be filtered 
out via the use of identically dressed testers, but rather a race proxy-a 
mechanism for racially disparate treatment. Similarly, most of the 
161 See, e.g., RICHARD J. DAVIS, NEW YORK COMM'N TO COMBAT POLICE CORRUPTION, FOLLOW-
UP REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS BUREAU COMMAND CENTER 1-5, 17 (1999) (describing 
center that takes 20,000 complaints per year); see also Douglas S. Massey & Garvey Lundy, Use of 
Black English and Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets, 36 URB. AFF. REV. 452, 456--
59 (2001) (discussing their phone-based auditing study). 
162 See Quillian, supra note 61, at 303 ("[A]udit studies often are the best method for 
measuring ... discrimination."). 
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designs above would test disparities within neighborhoods (or at 
checkpoints), and would miss differences driven by neighborhood racial 
composition. Auditing is best designed to address intra-neighborhood 
disparities, which is an important limitation, although it bears 
emphasis that even if this were all it was good for, it would fill an 
important gap. As Part II illustrated, regression methods are a 
reasonably effective tool for estimating inter-neighborhood disparities; 
it is the disparate treatment of individuals within neighborhoods that 
is the most difficult to get at using observational methods, because of 
the absence of individual-level data. 
The auditing design could, in any event, be extended to test the 
effects of the neighborhood or other race-correlated variables and their 
interaction with individual race-for example, by changing the same 
testers' clothing or sending them to different neighborhoods. An 
advantage over observational studies of inter-neighborhood disparities 
is that this approach could rule out, as an explanation for those 
disparities, inter-neighborhood differences in the behavior of the 
individuals being approached. That is, if testers act the same in every 
neighborhood, systematic differences in their treatment across 
neighborhoods would provide strong evidence that it is not the testers, 
but an actual difference in police approaches. Still, even if auditing 
reveals inter-neighborhood disparities, it would not necessarily mean 
that that difference is because of neighborhood racial composition. 163 
Similarly, evidence that the police disfavor some characteristic like a 
clothing style would not definitively prove that they are using it as a 
race proxy. 
Auditing would produce context-specific estimates, not an overall 
measure of racial discrimination in stops or arrests. 164 These estimates 
will be more informative if the test is similar to some class of activity 
that produces a reasonable share of the department's stops or arrests. 
Loitering and minor-in-possession are good examples. 
E. Implementation 
Given its longstanding role in civil rights enforcement, federal or 
state agencies' use of auditing to assess police disparities is plausible. 
Tester programs in other areas have sometimes been controversial, 165 
163 Researchers could try to account for other neighborhood differences by adding the same 
sorts of controls (e.g., reported crime rate differences) that observational studies do. 
164 Cf. Heckman, supra note 152, at 102-11 (criticizing employment audit studies for not 
estimating market discrimination). 
165 See Selmi, supra note 141, at 1427; Alex Young K. Oh, Using Employment Testers to Detect 
Discrimination: An Ethical and Legal Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 473, 480 (1993) (citing 
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and certainly may be in this context as well, but there are 
countervailing political pressures. In surveys, large majorities oppose 
racial profiling.l66 The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice has a strong interest in the issue and in police abuses 
generally, 167 and the issue has been a high overall priority following 
recent events.l68 Outside-agency auditing would lose some of the 
advantages of police-department self-monitoring (for example, access to 
internal data), but outside auditors could still employ trained 
undercover officers and protect them from physical or legal harm. The 
outside-enforcement approach would face less risk of being 
compromised by leaks or internal resistance. It is the most plausible 
strategy when a police department is hostile to scrutiny. 
Auditing could also be required by court order or settlement in civil 
rights litigation. Analogously, the New Jersey Attorney General's office 
carried out a major benchmarking study under a settlement with the 
U.S. Department of Justice.l69 Outside monitors have been appointed 
for numerous police departments, often under consent decrees. 170 
Voluntary self-auditing by police departments is promising, but is 
it realistic? Mter all, adverse findings could be embarrassing and invite 
litigation. Moreover, the studies could be resource-intensive and risk 
angering officers and unions. Still, while many departments would 
doubtless reject the idea, the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the 
U.S. are not monolithic. Typically, agency heads are political 
appointees, and there is no reason to assume that all cities' political 
employer fears of tester litigation). 
166 Emily Eakins, Poll: 70% of Americans Oppose Racial Profiling by the Police, REASON 
FOUNDATION (Oct. 14, 2014), http;//reason.com/poll/2014/10/14/poll-70-of-americans-oppose-racial-
profi [https: //perma.cc/84GM-CQ2E]. 
167 See Addressing Police Misconduct Laws Enforced by the Department of Justice, U.S. DEP'T 
OF JUSTICE, http://www .justice.gov/crt/about/spl!documents/polmis.php [https: //perma.cc n77 J-
DAQM]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY (2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/ag /pages/ attachments/20 14/12/08/use-of-race-policy. pdf [https: //perma.cc IW 5LX -JBBE]. 
16
" Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement by Attorney General Eric Holder on Latest 
Developments in Ferguson, Missouri (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/statement-
attorney-general-eric-holder-latest-developments-ferguson- missouri [https: //perma.cc /5PYG-
XES9]. 
169 See Lange et al., supra note 85, at 196-97. 
170 See, e.g., Agency Profiles, NAT'L ASSOC. FOR CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENF'T, 
http: //www.nacole.org /agency_profiles [https: //perma.cc!SP6M-3XT6] (providing detailed profiles 
of civilian oversight agencies); see also Sanchez et al., supra note 32 (describing the three-year 
monitoring plan adopted by New York City as part of the settlement reached in the Floyd 
litigation); Barbara Attard, Oversight of Law Enforcement Is Beneficial and Needed-Both Inside 
and Out, 30 PACE L. REV. 1548, 1550 (2010). 
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leaders would be primarily interested in hiding racial discrimination 
rather than eliminating it. 
Hundreds of police departments have already invested 
considerable resources in collecting racial disparity data, and many 
have carried out ambitious studies.l71 Some police departments have 
"early warning" programs to identify individual problem officersY2 Any 
of these programs risk litigation or officer backlash-indeed, programs 
that risk getting individual officers in trouble may raise a worse risk of 
backlash than auditing does.l73 These risks have not precluded these 
programs' adoption. 
There is substantial precedent for using undercover police work to 
help departments self-diagnose problems. Some departments use a 
practice called "red teaming" to test police responses to security threats 
and emergency situations.l74 Undercover agents are also often 
employed in police corruption investigations.l75 Several police 
departments (including New York and Los Angeles) regularly conduct 
"random integrity tests"-exposing officers to random stings.176 
Corruption is likely as embarrassing to police departments as racial 
discrimination is-yet these departments have carried out the 
corruption equivalent of auditing. 
Even if departments can be persuaded to undertake auditing 
studies, can they be trusted not to undermine their accuracy? Internal 
affairs divisions and police leadership have often been sharply 
171 See, e.g., ENGEL et al., supra note 85; Law Enforcement, CTR. FOR POLICING EQUITY, 
http: 1/policingequity.org/law-enforcement/ [https: //perma.cc/2RHV-32X8] (describing CPE's work 
with police departments). 
172 Robin S. Engel & Jennifer Calnon, Comparing Benchmark Methodologies for Police Citizen 
Contacts: Traffic Stop Data Collection for the Pennsylvania State Police, 7 POLICE Q. 97, 109 
(2004); see RIDGEWAY, supra note 94, at 21-30. 
173 Unions generally strongly oppose policies with potential adverse consequences for 
individual officers. Engel & Calnon, supra note 172, at 109; Kevin M. Keenan & Samuel Walker, 
An Impediment to Police Officer Accountability?, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 198--99 (2005). 
174 The term comes from military wargaming exercises. Michael K. Meehan, Red Teaming for 
Law Enforcement, 74 POLICE CHIEF 22; see FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Subject Bibliography: 
Red Teaming, https: //www.hsdl.org /?view&did=702932 [https: //perma.cc/9VB6-MKUX] (collecting 
sources); William H. Adcox, The Red Team: An Innovative Quality Control Practice in Facility 
Security, 74 POLICE CHIEF 54 (2007) (describing "breach exercise[s]" carried out by undercover 
teams at protected facilities). 
175 E.g., Steve Rothlein, Legal & Liability Risk Management Institute, Conducting Integrity 
Tests on Law Enforcement Officers, LEGAL LIABILITY AND RISK MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE (2010), 
http://www. patc.com/weeklyarticles/printlle_integrity _tests.pdf [https: //perma.cc /9B3D-SH9C]; see 
Tim Prenzler & Carol Ronken, Police Integrity Testing in Australia, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 
319, 319 (2001) (describing undercover integrity testing in Australia as an "essential" 
anticorruption tool). 
176 Rothlein, supra note 175; Prenzler & Ronken, supra note 175, at 321-23; Sanja Kutnjak 
lvkovic, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 617-19 (2003). 
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criticized for papering over police misconduct and corruption. 177 Under 
the right conditions, however, the prospects for effectiveness are 
reasonable. Self-studies will be more credible if undertaken together 
with outside watchdog organizations or academic researchers who have 
control over data collection and analysis178-provided those outside 
actors are truly independent.l79 Undercover agents, presumably 
borrowed from other departments, would have to be carefully chosen, 
because they would have to be trusted not to tip off other officers or to 
try to manipulate the study's findings. 180 
If police departments are reluctant to expose themselves to liability 
or criticism, they could conduct internal auditing programs without 
publicizing results, or ask academic collaborators to publish 
anonymized results. To encourage self-studies, legislatures could 
consider creating evidentiary privileges. Congress has enacted just 
such "self-testing" privileges for mortgage lenders and creditors in the 
Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. 181 · The 
privileges apply only if, upon discovering evidence of discrimination, 
the lender undertakes "appropriate corrective action."182 If legislatures 
applied similar privileges to police self-testing, they would be modest 
extensions of the "self-criticism privileges" that law enforcement 
agencies already often invoke (which cover subjective analyses but not 
underlying facts)_183 
If government involvement proves impracticable, academic 
researchers might be able to carry out some of the designs on their own, 
177 E.g., Ivkovic, supra note 176, at 596-97. 
178 This is the modus operandi of the Center for Policing Equity, which connects researchers 
with police departments. See Law Enforcement, supra note 171; see Merrick Bobb, Civilian 
Oversight of the Police in the United States, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 151, 159-63 (2003) 
(describing some departments' voluntary use of accountability organizations, independent 
investigators, and civilian review boards to monitor use of force and corruption). 
179 Civilian oversight boards have often been criticized for being overly deferential to police. 
E.g., Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Civilian 
Oversight of the Police Should Function and How it Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 11-12 
(2009). Academic researchers with external (non-police) funding may be better equipped to provide 
accountability, but it will be important to negotiate agreements preserving researchers' control 
over reporting of results. 
180 Cf. Riach & Rich, supra note 131, at F483 (worrying that "consciously or unconsciously, 
minority applicants may be motivated to prove the existence of discrimination."); see also 
Heckman, supra note 152, at 104. When police are investigating police, one might worry more 
about the opposite concern. 
181 See Tomkowiak, supra note 142, at 325-27. 
182 Id. 
183 See Josh Jones, Note, Behind the Shield? Law Enforcement Agencies and the Self-Critical 
Analysis Privilege, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1609, 1611-14 (2003). Federal privilege legislation 
could be grounded in Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, and could perhaps 
extend to state courts. 
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although this would entail greater challenges. Academic research is 
governed by Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight, 184 but IRBs 
generally focus on harms to subjects (here, police) and perhaps third 
parties. Here, essentially all the risk is on the research staff (the 
testers).l85 Even if an IRB decides such risks are outside its purview, 
ethical researchers should consider them. While well-informed research 
staff should be free to take on projects carrying non-zero risk (as much 
research entails), supervisors should aim to minimize the risk to 
research staffers, especially if they are students who may be reluctant 
to refuse. Designs such as passing through security checkpoints, for 
instance, may satisfy this requirement, at least if the researchers 
breach no laws (such as prohibitions of recording devices). 
Overall, while auditing designs could face serious practical and 
political hurdles, their use is plausible. They offer a potentially 
valuable new addition to the toolkit of researchers, civil rights agencies, 
and police departments. While what they measure is limited, it is 
exactly the thing that observational tools have in most contexts been 
unable to measure effectively: disparate treatment among similarly 
situated individuals, rather than neighborhoods. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Empirical research on race and policing poses many challenges, but 
it is worth trying to overcome these challenges because the stakes of 
the legal and policy debates such research seeks to inform are high. In 
many communities of color, intensive police presence fundamentally 
shapes daily life. Racial disparities in policing have recently come to 
the forefront of the national conversation, but they are not new; despite 
decades of research, we still do not have a clear picture of the reasons 
for them. 
Constitutional litigation can be a valuable tool for redressing 
disparities, and constitutional doctrine specifically asks us to identify 
whether racially disparate outcomes are the result of disparate 
treatment by the police. Many police departments themselves care 
about this question, having committed to the elimination of racial 
profiling. But in most contexts, we simply do not have the data and the 
statistical tools to engage in this kind of causal analysis, and we may 
need to turn to new ways of generating new kinds of data that allow 
184 This may be true even if researchers work with government, depending on their roles. 
185 Research guidelines also generally permit dispensing with informed consent if the research 
design requires it (as it does here) and the potential harm is minimal. See Pager, supra note 131, 
at 126. 
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more rigorous analyses. The use of testers is one approach worth 
considering seriously. 
There are multiple promiSmg empirical strategies for analyzing 
racial disparities, and I do not suggest that the use of field experiments 
is likely to displace the need for careful observational analyses. Such 
analyses have already provided useful insights on some questions, and 
I have suggested some ways to push observational research further, 
such as the creation of more ambitious surveys about behavior and 
police-citizen contacts. But such research will always face omitted-
variable and causal-inference challenges, and experimental work can 
be a very useful supplement. Current research has, in substantial 
ways, fallen short, despite decades of serious and resource-intensive 
efforts. It is time to think creatively about new solutions. 

